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Abstract 
Aim: The current study examined the impact of staff perceptions of safety climate (i.e., senior 
and supervisory leadership support for safety), teamwork climate, and mindful organizing on 
three self-reported measures of safety outcomes (i.e., overall perceptions of patient safety, 
overall patient safety grade, and turnover intention) at a large community hospital in Southern 
Ontario. 
Methods: Survey and interview data were collected from nurses, allied health professionals, 
and unit clerks working on one of four units: ICU, general medicine, adult mental health, or the 
ED. In total, 183/247 eligible clinical staff returned a completed survey (response rate = 74%); 4-
6 semi-structured interviews were conducted on each unit. 
Results: Hierarchical regression analyses showed teamwork climate was significantly associated 
with all three study’s predictor variables while senior leadership was significantly associated 
with overall perceptions of patient safety and overall patient safety grade. Non-significant 
associations were found between supervisory leadership, mindful organizing and the three 
outcome variables.  
The qualitative findings corroborated the survey results while also providing important 
insights into why certain statistical relationships were found to be non-significant – e.g., 
interviewees perceived the safety specific responsibilities of frontline supervisors much more 
broadly compared to the narrower conceptualization of the construct in the survey. In addition, 
the qualitative findings helped expand the characteristics of the study’s key concepts – e.g., 
interviewees highlighted the prevalent negative impact of unit and profession boundaries on 
teamwork climate.     
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Practice Implications: Healthcare organizations should recruit into leadership roles and retain 
individuals who prioritize safety and possess adequate relational competencies. Furthermore, it 
is important to provide on-site workshops on topics (e.g., conflict and stress management) that 
can strengthen working relationships across professional and unit boundaries. The frontline 
clinicians would also benefit from on-site clinical training and presence of adequate staffing 
levels so they can provide high quality patient care. 
Conclusions: There is increasing empirical evidence regarding the importance of context-
specific factors for patient and staff safety, however, certain literature gaps still remain – e.g., 
an over-reliance on non-theory driven quantitative research. The current study has addressed 
some of these gaps, together with adding to our understanding of how context influences 
safety. 
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Chapter 1: Literature Review and Study Hypotheses 
 The complexity of healthcare delivery has steadily increased as a consequence of a 
number of factors including advancements in medical technologies, aging population, 
intricately organized care processes, comorbid chronic illnesses etc. (Institute of Medicine, 
2000). At the same time, certain areas of healthcare organizations such as emergency 
departments, surgical and intensive care units are increasingly exhibiting tight coupling in terms 
of processes, personnel, equipment, and other resources (Perrow, 1999). Under these 
circumstances, occurrence of medical errors by well-intentioned, highly skilled and educated 
clinicians is unavoidable. Most of these medical errors cause no or minor patient harm but 
some adverse events have serious consequences for patients including permanent disability 
and death. Empirical evidence suggests that an adverse event occurs in up to 10% of 
hospitalizations, about half of which are preventable (e.g., Baker et al., 2004; Davis et al., 2001; 
Thomas et al., 2000).  Evidence further suggests that healthcare error is costly. For example, 
surgical site infections in Canadian acute care hospitals result in $24.4 million in extra health 
care costs annually and 65% of these infections are preventable (Etchells et al., 2012).  
 In the health care domain, application of standardized clinical interventions such as 
hand hygiene guidelines (Goldmann et al., 2009), and surgical checklists (World Health 
Organization, 2008) has seen much success in improving anaesthesia care and reducing 
medication, diagnostic and surgical errors (Ruchlin, Dubbs, & Callahan, 2004). There is, 
however, also evidence that the climate and/or culture of a setting is an important contextual 
factor which has influenced the likelihood of successful implementation of patient safety 
improvement interventions such as checklists (e.g., Bosk, Dixon-Woods, Goeschel, & Pronovost, 
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2009) and initiatives to reduce central line infections in the intensive care unit (e.g., Pronovost 
et al., 2006). Furthermore, recent work in hospital and nursing home settings is beginning to 
provide empirical support for the relationship between safety climate/culture and patient 
safety outcomes (e.g., Bonner, Castle, Men, & Handler, 2009; Singer et al., 2009b; Thomas et 
al., 2012).  
The culture and climate research has distinct origins – the concept of culture emerged 
from anthropological research that focused on understanding the collective nature of a group 
of individuals by relying on an aggregated unit of analysis (e.g., at department or organization 
level), whereas, the concept of climate was first introduced by industrial psychologists 
interested in understanding individual perceptions by relying on the individual unit of analysis 
(Schneider, Ehrhart, & Macey, 2013). Even though the origins of culture and climate research 
differ, both concepts suffer from a lack of definitional precision and associated measurement 
problems – there are ongoing debates on the dimensions that should be considered 
components of organizational culture/climate and how best to measure them (Zohar & 
Hofmann, 2012). To complicate matters further, some organizational researchers have used the 
terms culture and climate interchangeably without clarifying subtle yet important differences 
between these two concepts.   
Most scholars agree that culture consists of deep and surface level elements (Zohar & 
Hofmann, 2012). The deep-level elements of culture consist of (a) basic assumptions about past 
organizational actions that proved successful in overcoming internal or external challenges and 
(b) core values that serve as a moral compass for individuals and organizations. Over time, 
these unquestioned basic assumptions and core values are unconsciously ingrained making it 
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difficult for the organizational employees to decipher them. Consequently, it is suggested that 
the only reliable way to discover the deep level elements of culture is to conduct in-depth 
longitudinal qualitative studies (Flin, 2007; Halligan & Zecevic, 2011; Schneider, Ehrhart, & 
Macey, 2013).       
The surface level elements of culture – i.e., climate – involve perceptions of observable 
(a) artifacts (e.g., organizational myths and stories, policies, procedures, and practices) and (b) 
behaviours that are rewarded or supported by leaders (Zohar & Hofmann, 2012). Furthermore, 
perceptions of climate are domain specific – e.g., safety climate, innovation climate, customer 
service climate etc. – rather than global or generic in nature (Ginsburg, Tregunno, Norton, 
Mitchell, & Howley, 2014). This domain specific definition of climate also implies the 
simultaneous existence of a number of interacting climates at any given organization. For 
example, a teaching hospital should have coexisting climates for safety, efficiency, teamwork, 
research and innovation etc. Furthermore, many of the complex contemporary organizations 
are loosely coupled systems where frontline supervisors often exercise discretion while 
implementing or supporting policies created by the senior management. Consequently, 
employees take into consideration organizational hierarchy while forming perceptions of a 
given domain specific climate, i.e., domain specific climates are multi-level (Zohar, 2000; Zohar, 
2008; Zohar & Hofmann, 2012; Zaheer, Ginsburg, Chuang, & Grace, 2015).  
In health care settings, contemporary researchers have primarily relied upon survey 
instruments to capture climate perceptions of safety. However, some of these surveys are 
erroneously labelled safety culture surveys (e.g., Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s 
Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture) even though they are only capable of measuring 
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surface manifestations of culture (i.e., climate).   Furthermore, most of these safety climate 
surveys lack sufficient psychometric rigor and contain antecedent or outcome dimensions in 
addition to components of safety climate (Ginsburg et al., 2014; Singer & Vogus, 2013a). In fact, 
it is suggested that safety climate should be defined and measured much more narrowly by 
adhering to Zohar’s (1980) original definition of the concept as employee perceptions of 
management commitment to safety – see the section below on safety climate, page 8, for 
further discussion on this topic. 
At this juncture, it is also useful to note that climate level (i.e., mean, median, or percent 
positive response) and climate strength (i.e., within group variability) are different. In the 
organizational literature, safety climate by and large is defined as a shared team property and 
consequently much of the empirical research has focused on group level analysis of climate 
perceptions (Ginsburg & Oore, 2015; Gonzalez-Roma, 2011; Schneider & Salvaggio, 2002). In 
contrast, climate strength has been treated as a mere statistical hurdle to justify aggregation of 
individual level climate data to team/unit level. This approach to climate research has ignored 
instances when there is a lack of consensus/agreement among team members resulting in an 
incomplete utilization of the safety climate construct (Ginsburg & Oore, 2015; Singer & Vogus 
2013a). For instance, this has hindered the ability of hospitals to successfully implement 
appropriate targeted safety improvement initiatives as a clinical unit with weak safety climate 
will require different safety improvement strategies compared to a clinical unit with low safety 
climate. Consequently, the use of a climate profile that contains information on both climate 
level and climate strength, in healthcare research should facilitate implementation of targeted 
safety enhancing initiatives at a given clinical unit (Ginsburg & Oore, 2015). In the current study, 
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all hypotheses focus on mean climate perceptions (i.e. climate level) at the individual level of 
analysis, however, in keeping with the recommendation of Ginsburg and Oore (2015), climate 
profiles of clinical units will also be examined in order to provide a holistic picture of the climate 
personality of the clinical units participating in this study.  
Given the complexity of health care delivery systems, the prevalence of preventable 
medical errors, and the importance of culture/climate, the aim of the current mixed methods 
study is to examine the influence of pertinent context-related factors (e.g., teamwork climate) 
on self-reported safety outcomes (e.g., turnover intention) at a hospital setting.   
Study Background - Speak Up Workshop  
 Part of the inspiration for the current study can be ascribed to a safety culture 
improvement initiative, the “Speak Up” (SU) intervention, previously held for frontline staff in 
the emergency department (ED) at a large community hospital in Southern Ontario to improve 
inter- and intra-professional safety related communication.  The SU intervention included a ½ 
day simulation workshop for inter-professional staff held in June 2014 as well as follow-up 
activities to try to sustain attention to and improve practice around speaking up about unsafe 
and/or unprofessional behaviours that can threaten patient care.  Feeling able to speak up 
reflects one important dimension of climate in an organization or work unit.   
During the simulation workshop, five focus groups were held for frontline health 
professionals to elicit responses from participants on the content and effectiveness of the 
workshop. In addition, longitudinal teamwork climate survey (Sexton et al., 2006b) data were 
collected from ED staff (SU intervention unit) and staff in an intensive care unit (control unit) to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the SU intervention.  
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Analyses of the wave 1 (baseline) survey data collected just prior to the start of the 
intervention revealed significant differences between the teamwork climate scores in the ED 
and ICU.  Moreover, informal analyses of the focus groups revealed a number of thematic ideas 
consistent with high reliability theory. For example, focus groups’ discussions highlighted some 
of the factors responsible for the quality of communication and teamwork in the ED including 
deference to nurse’s expertise during a bedside crisis, physician leader’s support for improving 
safety related communication, importance of fast pooling of resources to contain an emerging 
crisis etc. These qualitative thematic ideas along with the quantitative teamwork climate survey 
findings, showing variation across clinical units in the same hospital, provided the impetus for 
the current cross-sectional study and helped inform the selection of clinical units, survey scales 
and semi-structured interview questions (discussed in Chapter 2). 
Enabling, Enacting, and Elaborating Safety Culture Framework  
As an overview, figure 1.1 outlines the conceptual model for this study, adopted from 
the enabling, enacting, and elaborating safety culture framework proposed by high reliability 
theorists (i.e., Vogus, Sutcliffe, & Weick, 2010; Singer & Vogus, 2013b). This framework 
indicates that external (e.g., accreditation) and internal actions (e.g., leader behaviours, human 
resource practices) shape safety climate perceptions of frontline staff by prioritizing or 
subordinating safety over other organizational goals (e.g., efficiency) – the enabling piece. This 
in turn motivates or discourages, the frontline staff to participate in safety enhancing 
behaviours (e.g., teamwork, mindful organizing, error reporting) capable of improving safety 
outcomes (e.g., fewer hospital errors) – the enacting piece. In this model, safety climate is an 
important internal mechanism/motivator that links preceding enabling and subsequent 
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enacting safety interventions. Finally, enabling and enacting activities can be refined and 
enlarged through elaborating practices (e.g., team-based training) to further reinforce safe 
behaviours. In sum, the framework stipulates that a positive safety culture will emerge over 
time through a continuous cycle of enabling, enacting, and elaborating activities.  
 
This framework categorizes a wide range of safety interventions/activities as enabling, 
enacting, or elaborating a culture of safety. However, the current study will focus on safety 
climate, teamwork climate, mindful organizing and a handful of pertinent safety outcomes, 
highlighted in yellow in figure 1.1. More specifically, the current study will examine the 
influence of staff perceptions of leadership support for safety (i.e., safety climate), mindful 
organizing, and teamwork climate on staff self-reported perceptions of safety outcomes (i.e., 
overall perceptions of patient safety and overall patient safety grade). The current study will 
also examine employee’s self-reported turnover intention as an individual level staff outcome. 
The rationale for including turnover intention as an outcome is threefold. First, past empirical 
research suggests that a wide variety of constructs are significant predictors of turnover 
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intention including national culture (Liou & Cheng, 2010), organizational and occupational 
commitment (Liou & Grobe, 2008), job satisfaction and burnout (Meeusen et al., 2011), 
remuneration (Fochsen, Sjogren, Josephson, & Langerstrom, 2005), quality of teamwork and 
interpersonal relationships (Estryn-Behar et al., 2007), workload (Zeytinoglu et al., 2007), unit 
size (Sellgren, Kajermo, Ekvall, & Tomson, 2009), supportive management (Smith et al., 2005) 
and supportive colleagues (Hwang & Chang, 2009). Second, a strong and significantly positive 
relationship exists between turnover intention and actual leaving behaviours (Bluedorn, 1982; 
Schwepker, 2001). Consequently, in research, turnover intention can serve as a valid proxy for 
the actual leaving behaviours (Bothma & Roodt, 2013). Third, employee turnover has negative 
economic (e.g., costs associated with hiring and training of new employees) and operational 
(e.g., poor quality of care delivery due to inadequate staffing) implications for an organization 
(Hayes et al., 2012).   
At this juncture, it is important to note that past empirical research on turnover 
intention has rarely defined this concept precisely, perhaps because the term is assumed to be 
self-explanatory (Bothma & Roodt, 2013). However, this ambiguity has led to conceptual and 
measurement concerns as an employee’s intent to leave or stay can be defined in terms of 
unit/department, organization, or occupation (Chan, Tam, Lung, Wong, & Chau, 2013). 
Furthermore, past research has often relied upon single item scales to measure turnover 
intention with obvious scale psychometric limitations (Bothma & Roodt, 2013). To address 
these concerns, turnover intention in the current study was operationalized as behavioural 
intent of an employee to transfer to a different unit in the same organization or to seek 
employment at a different organization while staying in his/her occupation. Moreover, the 
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current study relied upon a multi-item turnover intention scale with good psychometric 
properties (see Chapter 2, p. 37).        
Next, justification for examining the influence of each of the study’s predictor variable 
on selected safety outcomes is discussed in detail.      
Safety Climate 
 As mentioned previously, most of the current safety climate surveys contain antecedent 
or outcome dimensions in addition to components of safety climate (Ginsburg et al., 2014; 
Singer & Vogus, 2013a). The construct of safety climate was originally defined as employee’s 
perceptions of management commitment to safety (Zohar, 1980) and the research community 
needs to return to this original definition of safety climate for conceptual, measurement, and 
practical purposes (Singer & Vogus, 2013a; Zaheer et al., 2015). The current study has adhered 
to this proposition by defining safety climate in terms of employee’s perception of leadership 
support for safety at two levels – senior and supervisory. Employees differentiate between the 
priorities of senior management and unit supervisors, resulting in the emergence of 
perceptions of two concurrent levels safety climate (Zohar, 2000; Zohar, 2008; Zohar & 
Hofmann, 2012).  Adopting a multi-level safety climate perspective is especially important in 
loosely coupled organizations such as hospitals where unit supervisors can often exercise 
discretion in implementing policies created by senior management. Indeed, one key aspect of 
evaluating patient safety climate lies in examining consistency between organizational level 
safety policies and procedures, and implementation practices in subunits that are subject to 
supervisory discretion (Zohar & Hofmann, 2012). Finally, leadership support for safety is one of 
10 
 
the most important and psychometrically robust dimensions of climate in the safety literature 
(Flin et al., 2000; Zohar, 2008), lending support to the inclusion of this construct in our study. 
Health care organizations trying to implement leadership-level initiatives to improve 
patient safety have traditionally relied on research literature from aviation and industrial 
sectors (e.g., Flin & Yule, 2004). Moreover, much of the empirical research that does exist in 
healthcare settings has primarily focused on safety related behaviours of leaders that can 
improve employees’ perceptions of safety climate such as participative leadership style (e.g., 
Zaheer et al., 2014), empowering leadership style (e.g., Yun et al., 2005), executive safety walk-
rounds (e.g., Frankel et al., 2008; Thomas et al., 2005), adopt-a-work unit (e.g., Pronovost et al., 
2004), and frontline safety forums (e.g., Tucker et al., 2008). The Institute of Medicine (2000) 
report, ‘To Err is Human’ suggested that the presence of strong, visible, and supportive 
leadership is not only important for creating a positive safety climate but also for improving 
safety outcomes. However, empirical support for the predictive power of staff perceptions of 
leadership on safety outcomes remains limited. Studies that have examined these relationships 
include work by Laschinger and Leiter (2006) on the impact of nursing work environments on 
nurse burnout and patient safety outcomes using a cross-sectional research design. Survey data 
were collected from hospital-based nurses in Ontario (N = 4,606) and Alberta (N = 3,991). The 
structural equation modeling analysis suggested that supportive leadership provided by nurse 
managers significantly influences nursing work environments (e.g., staffing adequacy, 
nurse/physician relationships) that in turn significantly effects nurse burnout and frequency of 
adverse events (i.e., falls, nosocomial infections, medication errors, and patient complaints).  
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In a focused ethnographic study, Cole and Crichton (2006) explored the effects of 
human factors (e.g., communication and inter-professional relationships) on the performance 
of ED trauma teams in a hospital in London, UK. Data were collected by direct observations of 6 
trauma events and 11 semi-structured interviews with staff members of the trauma teams. The 
qualitative data analyses indicated that a leader of a trauma team plays a critical role in 
facilitating team coordination and improving individual/team performance leading to optimal 
patient outcomes. Moreover, it was suggested that staff perceptions of a leader’s competence, 
experience, status, and supportiveness are positively related to trauma team performance and 
patient outcomes.  
A 2010 cross-sectional empirical study examined the relationships between staff 
perceptions of patient safety climate variables and a composite measure of in-hospital adverse 
events (Mardon, Khanna, Sorra, Dyer, & Famolaro, 2010). The study sample consisted of 179 
U.S. hospitals that had voluntarily submitted survey data from 56,480 staff to the 2007 Hospital 
Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSOPS) Comparative Database. The Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality’s (AHRQ) HSOPS survey collects data on 15 climate variables including 2 
on perceptions of leadership support for safety (i.e., “senior management support for patient 
safety” and “supervisor/manager expectations and actions promoting safety”). The bivariate 
analyses revealed that both of these patient safety climate leadership variables were negatively 
and significantly associated with the adverse events composite measure. However, these 
relationships became non-significant in a multiple linear regression analysis that adjusted for 
hospital characteristics (i.e., teaching status, bed size, and ownership) and other climate 
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variables, suggesting the need for further empirical work to evaluate the effects of leadership 
on safety outcomes in a hospital setting. In keeping with these findings, it is proposed that: 
Hypothesis 1a: Perceptions of senior leadership support for safety will be positively associated 
with overall patient safety perceptions and overall patient safety grade. However, perceptions 
of senior leadership support for safety will be negatively associated with turnover intention (see 
figure 1.2).  
Hypothesis 1b: Perceptions of supervisory leadership support for safety will be positively 
associated with overall patient safety perceptions and overall patient safety grade. However, 
perceptions of supervisory leadership support for safety will be negatively associated with 
turnover intention (see figure 1.2). 
Mindful Organizing 
 The processes of enabling (which occurs, in part, by the role that leadership plays as just 
described) creates contexts where safety is given priority over other organizational or 
departmental goals (e.g., production), thereby strengthening safety climate; however, enabling 
by itself is not sufficient to produce a safety culture. Frontline staff must also consistently 
engage in safety enacting practices/behaviours to reduce hospital errors (Singer & Vogus, 
2013b; Vogus, Sutcliffe, & Weick, 2010).  
High reliability organizations (HROs), such as nuclear power plants, are able to operate 
almost error free in highly complex and tightly coupled environments. There is growing 
realization that healthcare organizations can reduce the occurrence of preventable errors by 
implementing safety enacting practices/behaviours from HROs. These safety practices are 
characterized by five interrelated processes of mindful organizing – a) continuous tracking of 
small failures, b) resisting oversimplifications, c) attending to the needs of frontline operations, 
d) developing capabilities for resilience, and e) migrating decision making towards expertise 
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(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999; Shrivastava, Sonpar, & Pazzaglia, 
2009). The first three principles of mindful organizing help an organization prevent unexpected 
errors while the last two principles help mitigate errors that have already transpired before 
they can develop into debilitating disasters.      
Before discussing the processes of mindful organizing in more detail, it is important to 
note here that Vogus and Sutcliffe (2007a) originally conceived mindful organizing as a safety 
climate dimension. However, Zohar (2008) has argued that mindful organizing is an example of 
‘proactive’ or ‘extra-role’ behaviours resulting from work-ownership climate – he describes the 
relationship between work-ownership climate and mindful organizing in a similar manner to the 
antecedent-outcome relationship that exists between safety climate and safety behaviours. The 
current study adheres to Zohar’s (2008) conceptualization of mindful organizing as employees’ 
discretionary or voluntary extra-role behaviours that are distinct from safety behaviours such as 
safety specific teamwork or communication among employees.      
 Preoccupation with failure implies that HROs pre-emptively seek out weak signals of 
any failure or near miss and respond to these weak signals strongly as they might be indicators 
of much larger system wide problems (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). HROs accomplish the task of 
continuous tracking of small failures by fostering a climate of openness where employees feel 
safe to report and discuss errors (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999).  For example, increased 
rates of needle pricks suffered by the cleaning staff in an emergency department can either be 
ignored as irrelevant or seen as weak signals that the cleaning staff are handling medical waste 
without carefully surveying the surrounding areas. A hospital preoccupied with failures will 
respond to this weak signal with a strong response such as improving the quality of training 
14 
 
given to the cleaning staff or increasing the number of cleaning staff assigned to the ED so that 
they do not feel rushed while performing their daily activities.  
 HROs are reluctant to simplify contexts, expectations, and actions by using generic 
categories and labels. Categorization of information is unavoidable; however, over reliance on 
generic categories can create blind spots that conceal early signs of unexpected events (Weick, 
Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999; Weick, 1987; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). For example, ED patients are 
assigned to five different triage levels based on the severity of their symptoms (i.e., level 1 
resuscitation to level 5 non-urgent). However, triage is not a static process as the symptoms of 
a given patient can fluctuate quite rapidly necessitating reassessment and assignment to a 
different triage level. The problem arises when clinicians start to live-up to these labels by 
treating level 4 (less urgent) and level 5 (non-urgent) patients as though they are of low 
significance. When low significance or value is assigned to a task, workers are more likely to act 
mindlessly and pay less attention while completing such a task (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). In 
essence, generic categories (e.g., less urgent, non-urgent, urgent) can blind the ED staff and 
prevent them from detecting small discrepancies in the symptoms of patients. As a 
consequence, HROs simplify mindfully and take conscious steps to complicate their 
assumptions and simplifications. HROs complicate their simplifications by (a) seeking out 
disconfirming evidence to refine their existing expectations, (b) cultivating conceptual slack or 
requisite variety, that is, the presence of analytical variance on technologies, structures, 
processes etc., and (c) emphasizing respectful communication so team members with divergent 
views can reach a general or working consensus.  
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Sensitivity to operations in HROs is described as having a bubble or a higher level of 
situational awareness (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). This implies 
that members of an organization are able to integrate a number of diverse inputs from their 
environment to construct a cognitive map of frontline operations and be continuously able to 
update this map as new information becomes available. Due to human cognitive limitations, no 
single individual is able to develop a complete cognitive map of frontline operations. Therefore, 
sensitivity to operations is a shared undertaking that requires team/unit/organization members 
to speak-up and openly share information with each other (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). 
Furthermore, rapid allocation of resources by leaders to fulfil an evolving need at the frontlines 
is an essential ingredient for achieving sensitivity to operations. 
Commitment to resilience involves containing an unexpected error in real time while 
having incomplete information on its etiology, progression, and potential solutions (Sutcliffe & 
Vogus, 2003; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). HROs develop their 
resilience capabilities by fostering strategies such as improvisation, conceptual slack, respectful 
communication, reliance on generalist teams, and formation of temporary networks of 
knowledgeable members to overcome an unexpected event. In a hospital setting, all these 
strategies are apparent each time a code blue (i.e., a patient in need of resuscitation) is 
announced over a public-address system. 
Deference to expertise occurs when problems are linked with expertise and decision-
making responsibility migrates (both up and down) to a person or a group with specific 
knowledge of the problem (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). Most 
traditional organizations defer to hierarchical authority and decisions are exclusively made by 
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senior management. Hierarchical authority structures also exist in HROs but these organizations 
have learned to loosen these structures for effective real time decision making. 
Much of the empirical evidence on the capacity of mindful organizing to minimize 
occurrences of errors/failures comes from outside of the healthcare domain. These studies can 
be grouped under two broad categories: a) direct observations of operations at highly 
successful HROs (e.g., heedful interrelating on aircraft carriers by Rochlin, LaPorte, & Roberts, 
1987) and b) retrospective investigations of disasters/near disasters (e.g., Three Mile Island by 
LaPorte, 1982; Mann Gulch fire disaster by Weick, 1993; Columbia disaster by Weick, 2005).  
In the healthcare domain, empirical research on mindful organizing and safety outcomes 
is limited. Weick and Sutcliffe (2003; 2007) conducted a descriptive retrospective analysis of 
excessive paediatric cardiac surgical deaths at Bristol Royal Infirmary (BRI) in England where the 
mortality rate of open heart surgery for children under 1 year of age was approximately twice 
that of the other 11 paediatric cardiac surgical centers in five of the seven years between 1988 
and 1994. The retrospective analysis of the BRI culture suggested that all five principles of 
mindfulness were violated resulting in a higher mortality rate compared to other paediatric 
programs. For example, a culture of blame and fear persisted at BRI resulting in under-reporting 
of medical errors – violation of preoccupation with failure; deaths were simplistically labeled as 
either anomalies or overly complex cases – violation of resisting oversimplifications; there was 
no dedicated pediatric cardiac surgeon at BRI – violation of sensitivity to frontline operations; 
the nursing staff felt that they received conflicting treatment orders from anesthetists and 
surgeons hindering the ability of the ICU unit to successfully contain and bounce back from 
adverse events – violation of commitment to resilience; safety concerns raised by a consultant 
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anesthetist were repeatedly ignored by the senior leadership – violation of deference to 
expertise.  
Vogus and Sutcliffe (2007a) conducted a cross-sectional study for the development and 
validation of the Safety Organizing Scale (SOS). Data were collected from 1,685 registered 
nurses in 125 clinical units at 13 U.S. hospitals. The 9-item SOS, based on the 5 principles of 
mindful organizing, was found to have good psychometric properties. Further, results of the 
study suggested that higher mindful organizing at nursing units resulted in fewer reported 
medication errors and patient falls for a subsequent 6 months’ period. Similarly, a cross-
sectional survey study conducted at 78 nursing units in 10 U.S. acute-care hospitals found a 
statistically negative relationship between mindful organizing and reported medication errors 
(Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007b). Interestingly, the study also found that presence of a nurse manager 
who is perceived as fair, supportive, and trustworthy amplify the impact of mindful organizing 
on reducing medication errors. In keeping with these findings, it is proposed: 
Hypothesis 2: Perceptions of mindful organizing will be positively associated with overall patient 
safety perceptions and overall patient safety grade. However, it will be negatively associated 
with turnover intention (see figure 1.2). 
Teamwork Climate  
 The modern health care delivery system is highly decentralized where important 
stakeholders such as primary care physicians and hospitals often operate in silos leading to 
poor communication of patient information (e.g., medical history, prescribed medications etc.) 
and infrequent coordination of patient care across different settings (e.g., primary care, 
emergency department, home care etc.). This cottage industry operating structure leads to 
fragmented care, loss of patient information, wasted resources, unnecessary handoffs, 
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frustrated medical professionals and patients, and preventable medical errors (Institute of 
Medicine, 2001). In the past, health care delivery was primarily concerned with the diagnosis 
and treatment of acute illnesses. Consequently, highly specialized professionals operating in 
silos were often sufficient to provide appropriate treatment to patients. However, changing 
disease patterns and growing complexity of care delivery have now necessitated the healthcare 
system to emphasize teamwork behaviours including open communication (Sutcliffe, Lewton, & 
Rosenthal, 2004) and semi-synchronous cooperation (Berlin & Carlstrom, 2008) across 
providers and provider groups in order to reduce medical errors and improve patient safety 
outcomes (e.g., Berwick, 2003; Institute of Medicine, 2000).  
There is emerging empirical evidence linking staff perceptions of teamwork climate and 
safety outcomes in hospitals. For example, in the cross-sectional study by Mardon and 
colleagues described above, they also examined the relationship between staff perceptions of 
teamwork and a composite measure of in-hospital adverse events (Mardon, Khanna, Sorra, 
Dyer, & Famolaro, 2010). The bivariate analysis revealed that the relationship between staff 
perceptions of teamwork and adverse events composite measure was negative and statistically 
significant. This relationship remained negatively significant in the linear regression analysis 
that adjusted for hospital characteristics (e.g., teaching status) and other patient safety related 
variables (e.g., nonpunitive response to error).  
In a recent multivariate cross-sectional survey study, data were collected from staff on 
136 acute psychiatric wards in England to examine the relationships between ward/unit 
leadership, teamwork climate, ward structure (e.g., ward rules and procedures), staff burnout, 
staff attitudes towards patients (e.g., feelings of warmth, absence of anger), conflict (i.e., 
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harmful behaviours of psychiatric patients such as substance use, aggression towards staff, and 
self-harm etc.) and containment (i.e., staff actions to prevent or contain harmful behaviours of 
patients including the use of manual restraints and sedating medications) (Bowers, Nijman, 
Simpson, & Jones, 2011). Structural equation modeling (SEM) suggested that ward structure, 
burnout, and attitudes towards patients were all more strongly influenced/determined by 
teamwork climate and to a lesser degree by unit leadership. Moreover, cluster analysis found 
that better functioning wards (N = 78) used significantly fewer (undesirable) containment 
methods (i.e., 10% fewer) compared to the wards (N = 56) with poorer scores on teamwork 
climate, unit leadership, and burnout even though both clusters of wards experienced similar 
rates of conflict per day.   
Similarly, negative perceptions of teamwork climate are associated with increased odds 
of poor surgical outcomes (Mazzocco et al., 2009) while positive perceptions of teamwork 
climate are associated with positive safety outcomes including reduced incidence of 
unexpected cardiac arrests (Buist et al., 2002). Fortunately, teamwork behaviours can be taught 
and teamwork enhancing strategies including checklists (e.g., Pronovost et al., 2006) and crew 
resource management (e.g., Haller et al., 2008) have shown promise in improving safety in 
healthcare settings. In keeping with these findings, it is proposed:  
Hypothesis 3: Teamwork climate perceptions will be positively associated with overall patient 
safety perceptions and overall patient safety grade while being negatively associated with 
turnover intention (see figure 1.2).  
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Figure 1.2: Study Hypotheses  
Justification for the Current Study 
The healthcare research community has made important inroads in understanding the 
role of context-related factors in improving staff and patient safety, however, certain literature 
gaps still remain. The current study will attempt to address five specific literature gaps: (1) 
underuse of qualitative or mixed methods research (Woodward et al., 2010), (2) lack of 
empirical research rooted in theory (Singer & Vogus, 2013a), (3) limited empirical evidence of 
the beneficial impact of certain contextual factors (e.g., mindful organizing) on safety outcomes 
while being primarily focused on understanding the perceptions of nurses, (4) relegation of 
climate strength as a mere statistical hurdle to justify aggregation of individual level climate 
data to team/unit level (Ginsburg & Oore, 2015), and (5) imprecise conceptualization of the 
safety climate construct (Zohar, 2008). First, much of the empirical research on contextual 
factors has employed quantitative time-series, before-and-after, or cross-sectional research 
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designs (Woodward et al., 2010). However, context-related factors such as climate and culture 
are inherently socially constructed phenomenon and greater use of qualitative or mixed 
methods designs can provide valuable insights that may be missed by over-reliance on 
quantitative research (Singer & Vogus, 2013b; Turner & Gary, 2009). Second, there is a need for 
the empirical research focused on contextual factors including safety climate/culture to rely 
more heavily on conceptual models driven by theory (Singer & Vogus, 2013a). Third, most of 
the empirical research on leadership and safety in healthcare settings has primarily focused on 
senior leadership behaviours that can improve perceptions of safety climate (e.g., Frankel et al., 
2008; Thomas et al., 2005). In loosely coupled organizations such as hospitals, staff distinguish 
between the safety priorities of senior and unit leadership, leading to staff perceptions of two 
concurrent levels safety climate (Zohar, 2000; Zohar, 2008; Zohar & Hofmann, 2012). However, 
only a handful of empirical studies have attempted to simultaneously evaluate the impact of 
staff perceptions of senior and supervisory leadership on safety outcomes (e.g., Zohar, Livne, 
Tenne-Gazit, Admi, & Donchin, 2007). Similarly, there is limited empirical work on mindful 
organizing in medical settings and the research that does exist has focused exclusively on 
perceptions of nurses (e.g., Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2007a). Fourth, in organizational literature, 
climate strength has primarily been treated as a statistical hurdle for the justification of 
aggregating individual level climate data to team/unit level. This has resulted in an incomplete 
understanding of the climate construct as a lack of consensus among the team members on 
climate perceptions is often ignored (Ginsburg & Oore, 2015; Singer & Vogus 2013a). Fifth, 
there has been a proliferation of safety climate dimensions, many of which can arguably be 
considered antecedents or outcomes rather than components of safety climate (Zohar, 2008) 
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and it has been suggested that we return to a more focused definition of safety climate for 
conceptual, measurement, and practical purposes (Singer & Vogus, 2013a). A return to a more 
focused definition of safety climate will help the research community to distinguish this concept 
from other safety related dimensions so we can better understand its antecedents and its 
effects.  
The aim of the current empirical study is to draw on high reliability theory and utilize a 
mixed methods approach to examine more holistically the influence of nurses, allied health 
professionals, and unit clerks’ perceptions of leadership support for safety (i.e., safety climate), 
mindful organizing, and teamwork climate on self-reported perceptions of three safety 
outcomes (i.e., overall perceptions of patient safety, overall patient safety grade, and turnover 
intention), thereby addressing some important gaps in the organizational safety literature. 
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Chapter 2: Methods 
Research Paradigms 
A research paradigm can be defined in terms of ontological (i.e., what is the nature of 
reality?), epistemological (i.e., what is the relationship between the inquirer and research 
objects/subjects?), and methodological (i.e., how knowledge can be acquired?) assumptions or 
beliefs that mould all stages of a disciplined inquiry from the formulation of a research question 
to the dissemination of results (Guba, 1990; Hatch, 2002).  
The research enterprise in social sciences usually adheres to one of these five research 
paradigms: positivism, post-positivism, constructivism, critical/feminist, and pragmatism. The 
positivists believe in a reality driven by universal and unchanging natural laws that exist 
independent of human mind (i.e., positivism relies on realist ontology). The responsibility of a 
researcher is to discover the true nature of reality without influencing or being influenced by 
the phenomenon/subjects under study (i.e., positivism relies on objectivist epistemology). The 
positivists primarily conduct empirical experiments that preserve the mutual exclusivity of the 
researcher and subjects, thereby, keeping the research process value free (i.e., positivism relies 
on manipulative methodology) (Guba, 1990; Hatch, 2002).   
The post-positivists also believe in reality independent of human mind but they concede 
that its true nature is not completely discoverable because of human cognitive and perceptual 
limitations. Furthermore, they acknowledge that an inquirer can never achieve absolute 
objectivity during the research process as values are part of human psyche. However, a 
researcher can stay as objective as possible (i.e., post-positivism adheres to modified objectivist 
epistemology) while trying to discover a close approximation of the true nature of the 
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phenomenon under study (i.e., post-positivism relies on critical realist oncology). This is 
achieved by (a) being cognizant of and forthcoming on human biases and limitations, (b) relying 
on multiple sources of data, methods and/or investigators, and (c) subjecting the results of the 
study to close scrutiny by self and peers. The post-positivists seek to study a phenomenon of 
interest under natural settings and consequently they shy away from empirical experiments 
instead relying on cross-sectional and survey research. Moreover, systematic qualitative data 
collection (e.g., interviews and focus groups) and data analysis (e.g., constant comparison) 
techniques are encouraged by post-positivists to capture perspectives of participants (Guba, 
1990; Hatch, 2002).          
The constructivists believe in the existence of multiple realities created by individuals 
based on their everyday life experiences (i.e., constructivism adheres to a relativist oncology). 
An individual mental construction can only be elicited, refined, and understood through 
subjective interactions between the researcher and a participant (i.e., constructivism relies on a 
subjective epistemology). The aim of research is to identify all the available mental 
constructions of a phenomenon (i.e., hermeneutic aspect of methodology) and then find as 
much consensus among these individual constructions as possible through a continuous 
dialogue between the researcher and each of the study participant (i.e., dialectic aspect of 
methodology). This necessitates the inquirer to spend a considerable amount of time in the 
field interviewing and observing participants. Consequently, case studies and naturalistic 
inquiries are the archetypical research methods used by constructivists (Guba, 1990; Hatch, 
2002).  
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The critical theorists believe that deeply entrenched social structures (e.g., neo-liberal 
capitalism) lead to the (a) clustering of resources and power in the hands of business elites, and 
(b) differential outcomes for individuals based on race, gender, and social class. Through 
sustained subjective interactions and dialogue, an inquirer seeks to raise awareness or 
consciousness of the oppressed study participants about the true nature of these real social 
structures (i.e., critical theory adheres to realist ontology and subjectivists epistemology). The 
data collection and analysis procedures are adopted from post-positivism and constructivism 
such as interviews, case studies, and naturalistic inquiries. However, the primary aim of critical 
theory research is to facilitate revolutionary or transformative action in order to improve the 
living conditions of marginalized individuals. Consequently, the methodology of critical theory is 
referred to as transformative (Guba, 1990; Hatch, 2002).     
The pragmatists reject the duality between an objective (as in postpositivism) and a 
subjective (as in constructivism) reality. Pragmatists believe that reality exists both in the mind 
as well as independent of the mind. Instead of focusing on ontological and epistemological 
concerns, the focus should be on better understanding a research problem by relying on 
pluralistic methodological approaches (Creswell, 2009; Morgan, 2007). The current mixed 
methods study adheres to pragmatic philosophical assumptions and relies on both quantitative 
and qualitative approaches to grasp an expanded/enriched understanding of constructs and/or 
hypotheses.  
Mixed Methods Study Design 
The issues facing the health sector are complex requiring interdisciplinary solutions, 
making mixed methods designs ideal for conducting research in this setting. There are several 
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classification systems of mixed methods designs in social and health sciences research (Creswell 
& Plano Clark, 2007). Creswell (2009) identified 6 types of mixed methods designs based on 
four important aspects of timing, weighting, mixing, and theorizing. Timing refers to whether 
quantitative and qualitative data collection occurs concurrently (i.e., in a single phase) or 
sequentially (i.e., in distinct phases). Weighting refers to whether quantitative or qualitative 
research is given priority in a study. Mixing of quantitative and qualitative data can occur at 
data collection, data analysis, and/or interpretation stages. Lastly, a mixed methods study may 
or may not utilize a theoretical perspective to guide the entire design.  
The current study utilized the concurrent embedded mixed methods design during 
which: 
a) Quantitative survey data and qualitative semi-structured interview data were collected 
concurrently, in a single phase, over a four-month period (September 30th, 2015 – 
February 1st, 2016).  
b) Analyses of quantitative survey data and qualitative semi-structured interview data 
occurred separately. 
a)  Mixing of quantitative results and qualitative findings occurred at the discussion stage 
of the current dissertation project where participants’ direct quotes from semi-
      
                                                               
                                                Analysis of Findings                                 Interpretation of findings                                                           
                                                  (Separate analysis of Quan & qual data)                          (Mixing of Quan & qual findings)                                                     
Data Collection                                                                                                                           
 
Figure 2.1: Concurrent Embedded Mixed Methods Design (adopted from Creswell, 2009)                                                    
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structured interviews were used to provide a more nuanced understanding of the 
relationships among the study variables (see figure 2.1).   
Setting 
The current study was conducted at a large community hospital, located in Southern 
Ontario. The hospital has approximately 400 inpatient beds and offers a variety of speciality 
services including cancer care, cardiac care, paediatrics and mental health services.     
Sampling 
         For the current study, data were obtained from frontline nurses (RNs and RPNs), allied 
health professionals (e.g., occupational therapists, social workers, respiratory therapists, 
physiotherapists, pharmacists), and clerical staff who worked on one of the four participating 
clinical units (i.e., ICU, general medicine, adult inpatient mental health, and ED).  The rationale 
for picking these 4 specific units was threefold: empirical research has shown that (a) staff 
perceptions of safety climate differ between hospital work areas (e.g., ED staff perceive weaker 
safety climate than staff from ICU, operating room, and post-anesthesia care unit) (Singer et al., 
2009a), (b) rates of adverse events are significantly higher in complex clinical settings (e.g., EDs) 
compared to less complex practice settings (Brennan et al., 1991; Thomas et al., 2000), and (c) 
EDs and ICUs may attract greater resources due to greater case acuity, specialized focus, and 
higher status of physicians and nurses. By contrast, clinical areas such as mental health have 
been noted for resource scarcity, quality issues, and inadequate staff training (Armstrong et al., 
2009) that may lead to negative staff perceptions of patient safety.  
28 
 
The current study’s inclusion criteria included frontline clinical staff (i.e., those in direct 
contact with patients including nurses, allied health professionals, and unit clerks) who have 
worked for at least six months on one of the four participating clinical care units. The exclusion 
criteria included anyone with a leadership role (e.g., nurse manager, nurse educator etc.) or 
anyone who is not in direct contact with patients receiving care on a given unit (e.g., clerical 
staff responsible for administrative duties such as booking appointments for a nurse manager).  
Physicians were not invited to participate in the current study for three inter-related 
reasons. First, it is difficult to enlist them in patient safety improvement initiatives (Wachter, 
2010). In research, for instance, this has often translated into low physician survey response 
rates when compared to other clinical staff (e.g., Singer et al., 2009a). Second, only a small 
number of full time physicians worked on two of the participating clinical units (i.e., general 
medicine and mental health). Moreover, unlike nurses and unit clerks, physicians are often not 
physically present on a clinical unit throughout a shift, making it difficult to recruit them given 
the current study’s data collection procedures (discussed in the next section). Third, physicians 
are more likely to be informally considered team leaders by other clinical staff. This would have 
further limited the pool of potential physician participants given the current study’s exclusion 
criteria.  
Survey Sample 
 The four participating clinical units rely on a variety of casual clinical staff to provide 
appropriate care for their patients. Many of these casual clinicians met the study’s inclusion 
criteria, however, it was not feasible to acquire accurate staffing numbers from the hospital 
/unit manager as these casual staff are often supplied by the healthcare staffing agencies and 
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are assigned to a given clinical unit based on need. During survey data collection, the aim was 
therefore to approach and recruit as many eligible full-time and part-time frontline clinical staff 
as possible by using non-probability convenience and snowball sampling procedures. The 
primary researcher visited each of the participating clinical unit for 4-6 weeks to distribute 
surveys. These on-site visits were spread across both the day and night shifts so the researcher 
could meet and give surveys to as many eligible staff as possible. In total, 245 eligible clinical 
staff (i.e., ICU = 66, General Medicine = 49, ED = 88, and Mental Health = 42) were given a 
survey by the primary researcher during the 4-6 months’ data collection period (4 units visited 
consecutively for approximately 6 weeks each = 6 months on site). On very rare occasions, 
clinical staff that met the study’s inclusion criteria refused to take a survey from the researcher 
(i.e., ICU = 2, ED = 1, and Mental Health = 1).  
Semi-Structured Interview Sample 
For logistical and practical reasons, it was decided from the outset of the research 
project to limit the total number of semi-structured interviews conducted on each participating 
clinical unit to a manageable number. First, the hospital’s ethics board granted approval for the 
study with the understanding that the data collection phase would be completed within a 4-
month time period. Second, there was resistance from nurse managers around granting the 
research team access to their clinical units as they had concerns the study would require too 
much time commitment from frontline clinical staff.  Given these practical concerns, five to six 
semi-structured interviews, lasting an average of 30 to 40 minutes each, were planned for each 
participating clinical unit.   
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A non-probability quota sampling procedure was utilized to recruit participants for the 
semi-structured interviews. This sampling procedure was utilized to ensure that at least one 
member of each of the targeted professional groups (i.e., RNs, RPNs, allied health professionals, 
and clerical staff) was interviewed if a professional group had more than 5 full time members 
on staff on a participating clinical unit (see table 2.1). The use of this type of quota system is a 
common approach for improving the quality of samples obtained through non-probability 
sampling procedures (Fowler, 2009). To accomplish this task, full time staffing numbers at each 
participating clinical unit were obtained from nurse managers.  
Table 2.1: Interview Participants per Unit 
 ICU General Medicine 
Full Time Staff # of Interview 
Participants 
Full Time Staff # of Interview 
Participants 
RPN 0 0 17 1 
RN 80 3 27 3 
AHP 10 2 7 1 
Clerical Staff 3 0 2 0 
 ED Mental Health 
Full Time Staff # of Interview 
Participants 
Full Time Staff # of Interview 
Participants 
RPN 1 0 20 2 
RN 79 3 40 3 
AHP 4 0 4 0 
Clerical Staff 17 1 3 0 
Data Collection Procedures           
The primary researcher visited the participating hospital for approximately 2 times per 
week from September 30th, 2015 to February 1st, 2016 to collect data from the 4 clinical units. 
However, the data collection was interrupted twice: once in late November – early December 
for 2 weeks as the primary researcher needed time to recover from influenza and the second 
time in late December – early January for another 2 weeks due to Christmas – New Year 
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holidays.  On average, the primary researcher’s visits on each unit were spread over a 4 to 6 
weeks’ time period (see table 2.2). 
The nurse manager was the primary logistical/contact person for each participating 
clinical unit. Each nurse manager helped identify time periods on a given day when frontline 
clinical staff may have sufficient slack time to participate in the study. This allowed the 
collection of data while having a minimal impact on clinical care provided by the frontline 
clinical staff. 
On each of the 4 clinical units, survey and interview data were collected in a single 
phase. However, during the first few days on a given unit, the researcher primarily focused on 
building rapport with the frontline clinical staff and only distributed surveys.  On subsequent 
days, both survey and interview data were collected on that unit. A clinical staff person 
participated in an interview only after the primary researcher had built good rapport with 
him/her and successfully recruited that individual to complete the survey on a previous 
occasion, e.g., at a different time, shift, day, or week. Collection of survey and interview data 
from any single individual were separated by several days to limit people’s tendency to try to 
make their survey and interview data internally consistent.  More detailed data collection 
procedures for surveys and interviews are discussed below. 
Table 2.2: Data Collection Timeline 
Unit Start of Data Collection End of Data Collection Total # of Days On-site 
ICU September 30th, 2015 November 16th, 2015 10 
General Medicine October 14th, 2015 November 16th, 2015 8 
Mental Health November 16th, 2015 February 1st, 2016 11 
ED November 18th, 2015 February 1st, 2016 9 
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Survey - Data Collection Procedures 
 The primary researcher was responsible for all facets of survey data collection on each 
of the 4 clinical units. A short oral presentation (< 1 minute in length) was prepared to solicit 
frontline clinical staff participation in the survey. This oral presentation introduced each 
potential survey respondent to the: a) study’s aim (i.e., the examination of patient safety 
perceptions of frontline clinical staff), b) inclusion criteria, c) and survey characteristics (i.e., 
voluntary, anonymous, cross-sectional, 29 items). Furthermore, each potential participant was 
informed that: a) the study’s ethics approval was obtained from the hospital’s Ethics board and 
b) the results will be shared with the staff at the completion of data analyses. The primary 
researcher handed out surveys to only those clinical staff that acknowledged that they meet 
the study’s inclusion criteria and are willing to participate in the study. Survey respondents 
were asked to indicate the clinical unit they work on; however, no individual identifiers were 
solicited (i.e., survey data were anonymous). 
 A survey drop-box was placed at each participating clinical unit to ensure that frontline 
clinical staff felt safe while returning completed surveys. As a small inducement to participate, 
chocolates were handed out to participants during the distribution of surveys and a $20 gift 
card raffle draw was held on the final day of data collection on each participating clinical unit. 
Semi-Structured Interviews - Data Collection Procedures 
An interview guide consisting of open-ended questions with multiple probes was utilized 
to help keep discussions focused on study variables (the interview guide can be found in 
Appendix 1). These open-ended questions and associated probes solicited staff perceptions of 
how (a) safety climate (i.e., senior and supervisory leadership support for safety) and (b) 
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teamwork climate influence safety outcomes at their clinical unit – the key variables of interest 
in this study’s conceptual model. The interviewer took hand-written notes and each session 
was audio recorded to ensure accuracy and to facilitate subsequent data transcription and 
analyses.  
All semi-structured interviews were conducted on-site and each nurse manager was 
responsible for providing access to office space on their respective clinical unit where the 
primary researcher conducted interviews. Before the start of an interview, the participant was 
provided with a consent form (two copies – one of these copies was kept by the participant for 
his/her personal record). The consent form: (a) highlighted details of the study (e.g., purpose 
and procedures), (b) assured confidentiality of the collected data, and (c) provided contact 
information of the research team. An interview commenced only after the participant: (a) read 
and signed the consent forms, and (b) received adequate answers to any questions he/she had 
relating to the study. At the end of each interview, a $5 gift card was given to the participant as 
a small token of appreciation for participating in the study. 
Privacy and confidentiality of participants was assured to the fullest extent possible by 
law. During the transcription process, all instances where names of individuals were mentioned 
in an interview were removed (i.e., interview data were anonymized). Finally, participants were 
assured of confidentiality in any final reports/publications arising from this research (i.e., they 
were informed that only aggregate results will be reported).  
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Ethics 
Ethics approval for the study was obtained from both the participating hospital’s Ethics 
Board and the Human Participants Review Sub-Committee, York University’s Ethics Review 
Board (Certificate #STU 2016 - 016).  
Quantitative Survey Measures 
A standardized 29-item survey instrument was constructed from previously validated 
scales to assess frontline health care staff (i.e., nurses, allied health professionals, unit clerks) 
perceptions of safety climate, teamwork climate, mindful organizing, overall perceptions of 
patient safety, overall patient safety grade, and turnover intention – study variables used in this 
research project which are described in detail below. In addition, the questionnaire collected 
demographic characteristics (i.e., age, tenure on unit, profession, and gender) from the survey 
respondents.  
Senior and Supervisory Leadership Support for Safety 
Senior leadership support for safety and supervisory leadership support for safety 
dimensions of safety climate were measured using the Canadian Patient Safety Climate Survey 
(Can-PSCS) (Ginsburg et al., 2014). The Can-PSCS is a 19-item theory based instrument that has 
strong psychometric properties validated by confirmatory factor analysis and is currently being 
used across a number of care settings as part of Accreditation Canada’s Qmentum 
Accreditation Program.  
The senior leadership support for safety scale has four items (e.g., “senior management 
considers patient safety when program changes are discussed”) and reflects staff perceptions of 
senior leadership commitment to patient safety (see table 2.3). The supervisory leadership 
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support for safety scale has two items (e.g., “my supervisor/manager seriously considers staff 
suggestions for improving patient safety”) and reflects staff perceptions of frontline-level 
leadership commitment to patient safety (see table 2.3). Senior and supervisory leadership 
support for safety were both previously shown to have strong internal consistency reliability, α 
> 0.80 (Ginsburg et al., 2014). Both of these safety climate dimensions were measured using a 
five point Likert scale where 1 corresponds to “strongly disagree” and 5 corresponds to 
“strongly agree”.  
The Safety Organizing Scale (SOS)  
The Safety Organizing Scale (SOS) captures the 5 principles of mindful organizing and 
consists of 9 items (e.g., “when errors happen, we discuss how we could have prevented them”), 
each measured on a seven point Likert scale (1 = “not at all”, 2 = “to a very limited extent”, 3 = 
“to a limited extent”, 4 = “to a moderate extent”, 5 = “to a considerable extent”, 6 = “to a great 
extent”, and 7 = “to a very great extent”) (see table 2.3).  
The internal reliability, convergent validity (i.e., the degree to which items in a scale 
converges on the same construct), discriminant validity (i.e., the degree to which a construct 
differs from other theoretically related constructs), and criterion validity (i.e., the ability of a 
scale to show expected relationships with its theoretically proposed causes and effects) of the 
SOS scale were assessed in a cross-sectional survey study of 1685 registered nurses from 125 
clinical units in 13 US hospitals (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007a). The confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) showed that 9 items of the SOS scale were reflective of a single underlying factor 
providing evidence for the convergent validity of the scale. Moreover, CFA modelling showed 
that items associated with SOS and two related safety climate constructs (i.e., trust in manager 
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and employee commitment) loaded onto a 3-factor measurement model, lending support for 
the discriminant validity of the SOS scale. The multilevel regression analyses lent support for 
the criterion validity of the scale as SOS was negatively related to reported medication errors 
and reported patient falls while positively related to trust in manager and employee 
commitment. In addition, the SOS scale was shown to have high internal consistency reliability 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.88). The psychometric properties of the SOS scale have also been 
examined in nursing home settings (Ausserhofer, Anderson, Colon-Emeric, & Schwendimann, 
2013), indicating that staff with different clinical backgrounds can easily understand and 
complete this scale. 
Teamwork Climate 
 The Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) has good psychometric properties and can be 
administered across a variety of care settings to evaluate frontline staff attitudes about 6 safety 
related domains (Sexton et al., 2006a). In the current study, the SAQ teamwork climate scale 
was used to measure staff perceptions about quality of teamwork on their respective care 
units. The SAQ teamwork climate scale has 6 items (e.g., “the physicians and nurses here work 
together as a well-coordinated team”), each measured on a five point Likert scale (1= “disagree 
strongly” to 5 = “agree strongly”) (see table 2.3). The SAQ teamwork scale was found to have 
good psychometric properties at the individual (Etchegaray & Thomas, 2012) and unit level 
(Sexton et al., 2006b) of analysis in hospital settings.   
Outcome Variables  
 The current study utilized 3 self-reported safety outcomes. Two of the safety outcomes 
were taken from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) Hospital Survey on 
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Patient Safety Culture (HSOPSC): overall perceptions of patient safety and overall patient safety 
grade (AHRQ, 2015). The HSOPSC overall perceptions of patient safety scale has 4 items (e.g., 
“we have patient safety problems in this unit”), each measured on a five point Likert scale (1= 
strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). The overall perceptions of patient safety scale was 
previously shown to have strong internal consistency reliability, α > 0.76 (Etchegaray & Thomas, 
2012). The overall patient safety grade has one item that asks to select a letter grade (A= 
excellent to E = failing) for the clinical unit’s performance on patient safety (see table 2.3).  
Turnover intention is the final safety outcome that was utilized in the current study. This 
3-items (e.g., “there is a good chance that I will leave this job in the next year or so”) scale has 
good psychometric properties – e.g., Cronbach’s α > 0.80 (Alexander, Lichtenstein, Oh, & 
Ullman, 1998; Lichtenstein, Alexander, McCarthy, & Wells, 2004). Each of the 3 items are 
measured using a seven point Likert scale where a higher score indicates a higher likelihood 
that a person would quit his/her current job (see table 2.3).  
 Senior leadership support for safety, supervisory leadership support for safety, mindful 
organizing, teamwork climate, and the three outcome variables were all treated as continuous 
variables in the current study (see Assumptions of Multiple Linear Regression section on page 
46 for justification). The negatively phrased items (i.e., 4d, 5c, 5d, 5h) associated with these 
scales were reverse coded to ensure that a high score on an item corresponded to a high score 
on a scale. However, we did not reverse code the three negatively phrased items associated 
with turnover intention scale (i.e., 5e, 5f, 5g) as it made intuitive sense that a high score on the 
scale corresponded to higher intention to leave.  
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 Missing scores on items were imputed using Expectation-Maximization (EM) estimation 
(see Chapter 3) and a mean score for each scale was then calculated for every survey 
respondent. However, it is recommended that statistical analyses should be run both with and 
without missing data imputations as that lends credence to a study’s findings (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2001). Consequently, in order to conduct hierarchical regression analyses without 
missing data imputations, a mean score for each scale was calculated if a respondent answered 
at least half of the questions associated with a scale.  
Table 2.3: Scales & Associated Items (Note: see Appendix 2 for the full survey instrument) 
Scale Items 
Senior Leadership Support for 
Safety 
3a) Senior management has a clear picture of the risk associated with 
patient care. 
3b) Patient safety decisions are made at the proper level by the most 
qualified people. 
3c) Senior management provides a climate that promotes patient safety. 
3d) Senior management considers patient safety when program changes 
are discussed. 
Supervisory Leadership Support 
for Safety 
3e) My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job 
done according to established patient safety procedures. 
3f) My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for 
improving patient safety. 
Teamwork Climate 4a) It is easy for personnel in this unit to ask questions when there is 
something that they do not understand.  
4b) I have the support I need from other personnel to care for patients.  
4c) Team input is well received in this unit.  
4d) In this unit, it is difficult to Speak Up if I perceive a problem with 
patient care.  
4e) Disagreements in this unit are resolved appropriately (i.e., not who is 
right, but what is best for the patient).  
4f) The physicians and nurses and other team members here work 
together as a well-coordinated team.  
Safety Organizing Scale 4k) When giving report to an oncoming nurse, we usually discuss what to 
look out for. 
4m) We spend time identifying activities we do not want to go wrong. 
4j) We discuss alternatives as to how to go about our normal work 
activities. 
4g) We have a good “map” of each other’s talents and skills. 
4i) We discuss our unique skills with each other so we know who on the 
unit has relevant specialized skills and knowledge. 
4h) We talk about mistakes and ways to learn from them. 
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4n) When errors happen, we discuss how we could have prevented them. 
4l) When attempting to resolve a problem, we take advantage of the 
unique skills of our colleagues. 
4o) When a patient crisis occurs, we rapidly pool our collective expertise 
to attempt to resolve it. 
Overall PS Perceptions 5a) Patient safety is never sacrificed to get more work done. 
5b) Our procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from 
happening. 
5c) It is just by chance that more serious mistakes don't happen around 
here. 
5d) We have patient safety problems in this unit. 
Turnover Intention 5e) There is a good chance that I will leave this job in the next year or so. 
5f) I frequently think of quitting this job. 
5g) I will probably look for a new job in the next year. 
Overall PS Grade 5h) Please give your work area/unit in this hospital an overall grade on 
patient safety. 
Demographic Variables 
 The survey also obtained data on five socio-demographic variables: clinical unit, unit 
tenure, age, gender, and professional background. Clinical unit was categorized into four 
groups: “ICU”, “general medicine”, “ED” and “mental health”, while tenure in a given clinical 
unit was categorized into three groups: “6-24 months”, “2-5 years” and “> 5 years”. Age was 
categorized into five groups: “< 30 years”, “31-40 years”, “41-50 years”, “51-60 years” and “> 
60 years”. Professional background was categorized into four groups: “registered practical 
nurse”, “registered nurse”, “allied health professional” and “clerical staff”, while gender was 
categorized into two groups: “female” and “male”. 
 All five of these demographic variables were transformed into multiple categorical 
variables (dummy variables) in order to use them in hierarchical regression analyses. A dummy 
variable must represent at least five percent of a study’s sample to carry statistically meaningful 
information (Katz, 2006). Consequently, two categories of age (i.e., 51-60 years and > 60 years) 
were combined to create a new category labelled, “> 51 years”. 
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 The categories of “general medicine”, “6-24 months”, “> 51 years”, “male”, and “clerical 
staff” were used as the reference groups for creating multiple categorical variables for clinical 
unit (3 dummy variables), tenure (2 dummy variables), age (3 dummy variables), gender (1 
dummy variable), and professional background (3 dummy variables) respectively. We then used 
the crosstabs function in SPSS to check for the accuracy of dummy variables against the original 
variables.         
Quantitative Statistical Analyses 
Survey data were entered into SPSS in small batches, less than 20 surveys, on any given 
day to minimize data entry mistakes associated with fatigue. Moreover, manual double entry of 
survey data, considered the gold standard for electronic data entry, was utilized to minimize 
the possibility of data entry errors (Paulsen, Overgaard, & Lauritsen, 2012). Each survey was 
assigned a unique identifier at the time of data entry. This allowed the random selection and 
rechecking of approximately 20% of entered data for errors. Furthermore, descriptive statistics 
(i.e., the range, minimum and maximum values) were utilized for identifying any out of range 
data values. However, no data entry errors were discovered during this whole process. 
Missing Values Analysis (MVA) 
All quantitative analyses were carried out using the SPSS software. First, Missing Values 
Analysis (MVA) with Expectation-Maximization (EM) estimation was used to impute missing 
values for 29 non-demographic survey items. MVA is a statistical procedure which 1) identifies 
patterns of missing values in a data set, 2) determines whether or not these values are missing 
at random, and 3) calculates mean values that can be inserted in place of missing values 
(Dancey, Reidy, & Rowe, 2012; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). In SPSS, these mean values can be 
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calculated based on data missing pairwise, data missing listwise, Expectation-Maximization 
(EM) estimation, and regression. Any one of these four missing data techniques is appropriate 
when the amount of missing data per survey item ranges from 1 to 5 percent (Roth, 1994). 
However, we utilized EM estimation for imputation of missing values as this procedure 
preserves the relationships among the survey items and is simpler to implement compared to 
imputations by regression (Graham, 2009; Roth, 1994).  
EM estimation produces the “Little’s MCAR test” statistic. The significance level of this 
statistic determines whether the data are missing at random (p > .05 – non-significant) or not 
missing at random (p < .05 - significant). It is appropriate to insert the means generated through 
EM estimation for missing values if the data are found to be missing at random (i.e., the “Little’s 
MCAR test” is non-significant). However, when the data are not missing at random (i.e., the 
“Little’s MCAR test” is significant) then multiple regression analysis must be utilized to calculate 
means for missing values (Dancey, Reidy, & Rowe, 2012).  
Cronbach’s Alpha 
Second, Cronbach’s alpha values were calculated for all the main study variables (i.e., 
senior leadership support for safety, supervisory leadership support for safety, teamwork 
climate, SOS, overall perceptions of patient safety, and turnover intention) to assess their 
reliability in the current data set. Overall patient safety grade consisted of a single survey item; 
consequently, Cronbach’s alpha was not calculated for this particular variable. Cronbach’s alpha 
is a statistical test that examines the correlational strength between the items of a scale. A 
scale is considered internally reliable when cronbach’s alpha correlation coefficient value is > 
0.70 (Dancey, Reidy, & Rowe, 2012; Katz, 2006). 
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Bivariate & Multivariate Analyses   
Third, simple bivariate analyses (Pearson r) were carried out to assess the strength and 
significance of relationships among the dependent and non-demographic independent 
variables. Pearson r values were also examined to ensure that multicollinearity was not a 
concern. Multicollinearity refers to the correlation strength between independent variables. 
High multicollinearity (i.e., r > 0.8) renders the results of regression analysis uninterpretable as 
it leads to statistically non-significant β coefficients even when R2 is high and statistically 
significant (Katz, 2006; Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 1991).    
Next, statistical analyses were run to determine whether or not demographic 
characteristics (i.e., gender, profession, tenure, and age) of the sample differed significantly 
across the 4 clinical units. First, chi-square statistic was calculated for each of the two nominal 
demographic variables (i.e., gender and profession) through the contingency table analysis. It is 
important to note here that the contingency table analysis has three specific assumptions: (a) 
categories of each nominal variable must be mutually exclusive, (b) at least one observation 
must be present in each cell of the table, and (c) the expected count must not fall below 5 in 
more than 20% of the cells (Dancey, Reidy, & Rowe, 2012). If more than 20% of the cells has an 
expected count of < 5 then the p-value for Fisher’s exact test should be reported instead of 
pearson chi-square test as the Fisher’s exact test is not vulnerable to low expected counts. 
Second, Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA was performed on each of the two ordinal demographic 
variables (i.e., tenure and age) to determine whether or not these variables differed 
significantly across the 4 clinical units. In case of a statistically significant Kruskal-Wallis test, 
pairwise comparisons were conducted by using the Mann-Whitney test. The p-value for each 
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Mann-Whitney test was adjusted using the Bonferroni correction to prevent the inflation of 
type 1 error rates (Dancey, Reidy, & Rowe, 2012). A type 1 error occurs when the null 
hypothesis is rejected when it is in fact true.           
 In order to test our study hypotheses, hierarchical regression analyses were utilized. 
Hierarchical regression analysis permits a researcher to examine the unique variance accounted 
for by a predictor, over and above the variance contributed by independent variables entered 
earlier in an analysis (Petrocelli, 2003). Demographic variables are typically good candidates for 
the first step in a hierarchical regression analysis (Cohen & Cohen, 1983), as they are static 
variables and should be entered in an analysis before the dynamic variables (Petrocelli, 2003). 
Hence, the current study placed the demographic dummy variables in block 1 of each 
hierarchical regression analysis.  
 The enabling, enacting, and elaborating safety culture framework stipulates that 
leadership behaviours shape frontline staff perceptions of senior and supervisory leadership 
support for safety – the enabling piece. This in turn motivates or discourages, the frontline staff 
to participate in safety enhancing behaviours (e.g., teamwork and mindful organizing) capable 
of improving safety outcomes – the enacting piece. Finally, both enabling and enacting activities 
can be modified, refined and enlarged through elaborating practices (e.g., team-based 
simulation training), resulting in the emergence of a positive safety culture over time as a 
consequence of a continuous cycle of enabling, enacting, and elaborating processes (Vogus, 
Sutcliffe, & Weick, 2010; Singer & Vogus, 2013b). However, according to the framework, the 
direct link between enabling and enacting activities is sequential and not bidirectional. 
Consequently, perceptions of enabling activities (i.e., senior leadership support for safety and 
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supervisory leadership support for safety) were entered in block 2 while perceptions of 
enacting activities (i.e., teamwork climate and safety organizing scale) were entered in block 3 
of the hierarchical regression analysis. Also, it is strongly recommended to run statistical 
analyses with and without missing data imputations if the sample size of a study is small, the 
proportion of missing values are high, and/or data are not missing at random (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2001). Consequently, the hierarchical regression analysis for each outcome variable was 
conducted twice, once with and once without missing data imputations.  
Unit of Analysis 
All study hypotheses were evaluated at the individual-level. However, at the unit-level, 
climate profiles for participating clinical units were calculated on each of the four explanatory 
(i.e., senior leadership support for safety, supervisory leadership support for safety, mindful 
organizing, and teamwork climate) and two of the three outcome variables (i.e., overall 
perceptions of patient safety and overall patient safety grade) – climate profile for turnover 
intention was not calculated as it is truly an individual level and not a unit level construct.  
The unit climate profile consists of three metrics: level, strength, and shape (Ginsburg & 
Oore, 2015). Simple histograms were created for visually examining and categorizing the shape 
of the distribution into one of the three types (i.e., normal, bimodal, or rectangular shape). 
Climate level per unit was calculated through a mean response score on each of the six 
variables. Finally, climate strength per unit was calculated by the interrater agreement (IRA) 
indices of rWG for the single-item overall patient safety grade and rWG(j) for the multi-item senior 
leadership support for safety, supervisory leadership support for safety, teamwork climate, 
mindful organizing, and overall perceptions of patient safety. However, rWG(j) was not calculated 
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for turnover intention as it is truly an individual-level construct and not a group-level shared 
construct. Aggregation of scores is appropriate when survey respondents are rating the same 
object, person, or process (e.g., a nurse manager, teamwork climate), however, it is 
inappropriate when respondents are rating their own emotional states or intentions (Bowers, 
Nijman, Simpson, & Jones, 2011). The rWG and rWG(j) can be mathematically presented by the 
following equations: 
𝑟𝑊𝐺 = 1 − 
𝑆𝑋
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Where S2X (in equation 1) is the observed variance for a single item variable (e.g., overall 
patient safety grade), S2Xj (in equation 2) is the mean of the observed variances for J number of 
items of a variable, and σ2E (in equations 1 & 2) is the expected variance when responses of 
participants show a complete lack of agreement (Biemann, Cole, & Voelpel, 2012; LeBreton & 
Senter, 2008). The expected variance is usually based on a uniform or rectangular null response 
distribution (e.g., on a 5 point Likert scale, each response option has a 20% chance of being 
selected by a participant). However, climate survey research is prone to response leniency bias 
and it is recommended to use skewed null distributions during the calculation of rWG/rWG(j) 
(LeBreton & Senter, 2008). Consequently, rectangular and slightly skewed null distributions 
were utilized in the current study. The rWG/rWG(j) values can range from 0 (i.e., lowest agreement 
or highest variability among respondents on a unit) to 1 (i.e., highest agreement or lowest 
variability among respondents on a unit).      
Equation 1 
Equation 2 
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Assumptions of Multiple Linear Regression 
 Multiple linear regression is used when the outcome is an interval variable such as blood 
pressure, weight, and temperature. However, in clinical research, multiple linear regression is 
often used to analyze variables constructed from Likert type scales that may include cues such 
as 1 = “strongly disagree”, 2 = “disagree”, 3 = “neutral”, 4 = “agree”, and 5 = “strongly agree”. 
Such a scale is not truly interval because the interval between strongly disagree and disagree is 
not necessarily the same size as the interval between agree and strongly agree. However, when 
variables constructed from such Likert type scales are used as dependent variables they work 
satisfactorily as long as they fulfill the three assumptions of multiple linear regression: (a) the 
presence of a linear relationship between dependent and independent variables, (b) dependent 
variables are normally distributed, and (c) dependent variables have equal variance around the 
mean (Dancey, Reidy, & Rowe, 2012; Katz, 2006).  
 The linearity assumption can be tested by constructing simple bivariate scatter plots of 
independent versus dependent variables. Consequently, simple bivariate scatter plots were 
constructed between each of the non-demographic independent variables and the three 
dependent variables to ensure the relationships were linear (see Appendix 3). However, even if 
bivariate scatter plots show linear relationships, it is possible that in multiple linear regression 
models, a non-linear relationship (e.g., U-shape, J-shape) may emerge between independent 
and dependent variables due to the presence of a confounding factor (Katz, 2006).  
 A preferable method of detecting linearity, normal distribution, and equal variance is by 
plotting the residual scatter plots - scatter plots of the standardized residuals as a function of 
standardized predicted values (Osborne & Waters, 2002). The assumptions of linearity, normal 
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distribution, and equal variance are met when the residuals are close to zero and evenly 
distributed – symmetrical above and below zero (Katz, 2006; Osborne & Waters, 2002). In 
addition, Probability-Probability plot (P-P plot) of regression standardized residuals of an 
outcome variable can confirm normal distribution and equal variance assumptions of multiple 
linear regression if the P-P plot appears as a straight line (Katz, 2006). Consequently, we 
employed both residual scatter plots and P-P plots to make sure that assumptions of multiple 
linear regression are met (see Appendix 4). The standardized residuals appear to be evenly 
distributed and fall within the three standard deviations (i.e., there are no outliers) on each of 
the three residual scatter plots. Furthermore, the P-P plots for overall perceptions of patient 
safety, overall patient safety grade, and turnover intention appear as straight lines.   
 The skewness statistic for each of the three dependent variables was also calculated to 
determine whether or not they are normally distributed. A variable is considered skewed (i.e., 
not normally distributed) if the skewness value is greater than twice the standard error of 
skewness (Dancey, Reidy, & Rowe, 2012). Overall perceptions of patient safety and overall 
patient safety grade were both found to be normally distributed while turnover intention was 
found to be slightly skewed (see Appendix 5). However, if the sample size is greater than 100, 
than the central limit theorem postulates that a variable should be considered normally 
distributed (Katz, 2006). The sample size of the current study is > 100 and as a consequence the 
use of multiple linear regression is appropriate. Moreover, multiple linear regression is a fairly 
robust statistical procedure and only significant violations of linearity, normal distribution, 
and/or equal variance can erode the confidence in the validity of the results (Katz, 2006).   
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Qualitative Analysis 
Two undergraduate research assistants transcribed all the semi-structured interviews, 
verbatim. Before commencing qualitative data analysis, the primary researcher: (a) compared 
each transcript with audio-recording of a given interview to confirm the completeness of the 
data and (b) anonymized the transcripts to protect the privacy and confidentiality of the 
participants (e.g., each interviewee was given a pseudonym).   
Analytical Techniques 
 The qualitative analysis is a systematic process of organizing and examining data for the 
discovery or verification of patterns, structures, relationships, and/or theories (Hatch, 2002). A 
number of systematic qualitative analytical techniques have been developed and refined but it 
is important to first briefly outline the four dimensions/characteristics that influences the 
choice of an analytical technique for a qualitative study. The first dimension of induction-
deduction refers to the ‘place of theory’ in a given study (Goetz & LeCompte, 1981; LeCompte 
& Preissle, 1993; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). A deductive research study begins with a theoretical 
perspective, operationally defines concepts related to that theory, and then evaluates whether 
or not the relationships between these concepts hold within the data set. On the other hand, 
an inductive research study begins with data collection, followed by the creation of a theory 
based upon the concepts and relationships discovered within the collected data. The second 
dimension of generation-verification refers to the ‘position of evidence’ in a given study (Goetz 
& LeCompte, 1981; LeCompte & Preissle, 1993; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). A verificative research 
tries to verify or falsify hypotheses that were previously proposed or developed in other 
scientific inquiries, that is, the creation of hypotheses is based on evidence from previous 
49 
 
research studies.  On the other hand, a generative research tries to discover propositions or 
hypotheses from within the collected data, that is, the source of evidence for hypotheses 
creation are collected during the study.  
The third dimension of construction-enumeration refers to how the ‘units of analysis’ – 
what’s observed or counted by a researcher – are formulated in a study (Goetz & LeCompte, 
1981; LeCompte & Preissle, 1993; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). In a constructive research, units of 
analysis are developed during data collection and analysis phases of a study. On the other hand, 
in an enumerative research, units of analysis are formulated before the start of the data 
collection phase of a study. The fourth dimension of subjective-objective refers to how the 
conceptual constructs are arrived at in a study (Goetz & LeCompte, 1981; LeCompte & Preissle, 
1993; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). A subjective research relies on participants’ own conceptual 
constructs to understand a phenomenon under study. On the other hand, an objective research 
relies on conceptual constructs created by external observers while trying to understand a 
phenomenon experienced by the study’s participants. Each of these four dimensions can be 
viewed as being on a continuum and the two sides of a continuum are not mutually exclusive. 
For example, a study can rely on both subjective and objective constructs to understand a 
research question and/or first generate hypotheses and then verify them in a subsequent 
phase.  
Goetz and LeCompte (1981) organized five qualitative data analysis techniques from 
across disciplines under a single classification umbrella by using the dimensions of induction-
deduction, generation-verification, construction-enumeration, and subjective-objective (see 
table 2.4 and figure 2.2).       
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Table 2.4: Analytical Techniques & Associated Characteristics/Dimensions 
Qualitative Analytical Techniques Associated Dimensions 
Analytic Induction Exclusively inductive and generative while being primarily 
constructive and subjective. 
Constant Comparison Exclusively inductive and generative while being primarily 
constructive and subjective. 
Typological Analysis An intermediate technique that is more likely to be 
deductive, verificative, enumerative, and objective.  
Enumeration Exclusively enumerative while being primarily deductive, 
verificative, and objective. 
Standardized Observational Protocols Exclusively verificative, enumerative, and objective while 
being primarily deductive  
      
 
Figure 2.2: Analytical Techniques – a broken line indicates that a technique can 
employ either side of a dimension while a solid line indicates invariance (cited from 
Goetz and LeCompte, 1981). 
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Analytic Induction involves scanning the qualitative data for the discovery of 
preliminary categories, patterns, themes and relationships. These preliminary concepts and 
relationships are continuously modified and/or refined as new information is revealed during 
the progression of data analysis (LeCompte & Preissle, 1993; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). An 
important feature of analytic induction is the conscious search for disconfirming information 
about a category, relationship, or hypothesis (LeCompte & Schensul, 1999). This conscious 
search for negative cases helps refine existing categories/relationships and protect researchers 
from prematurely concluded data analysis. In constant comparison, formal data analysis begins 
right after the collection of initial set of data. The information gleaned inductively from this 
initial data set is then used to refine or modify the subsequent phases of data collection 
(LeCompte & Preissle, 1993). In other words, constant comparison is a process of simultaneous 
collection and processing of qualitative data (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Analytic induction and 
constant comparison are designed specifically for the generation of social theory (LeCompte & 
Preissle, 1993) and can be used in a wide array of qualitative studies including ethnographies, 
participant observation studies, grounded theory studies, and phenomenological studies 
(Hatch, 2002). Typological Analysis starts with the selection of pre-determined categories 
generated from theory, atheoretical hypotheses, and/or common sense. The initial data 
processing stage then involves dividing the whole data set into chunks based on these 
predetermined categories (LeCompte & Preissle, 1993). As typological analysis is only practical 
when it is easy to identify the initial categories, it is ideally suited for the analysis of interview 
data with fairly focused research questions (Hatch, 2002). In enumeration data analysis, 
frequencies of categories are counted. This necessitates that: (a) data collection methods are 
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consistent across sites and (b) categories are precisely identified and defined (LeCompte & 
Preissle, 1993). In standardized observational protocols data is collected and coded 
simultaneously requiring careful operationalizing and field-testing of categories before the 
commencement of data collection. Consequently, such protocols are used in a study only after 
being developed and standardized, often by other researchers (LeCompte & Preissle, 1993).  
The Choice of an Analytical Technique 
 The choice of an analytical technique is effected by both internal (i.e., study related) and 
external (i.e., environment related) constraints (Goetz & LeCompte, 1981; LeCompte & Preissle, 
1993). The internal constraints include: (a) the purpose/goal of the study (e.g., verification of 
hypotheses or generation of a theory) and (b) strategies utilized for the collection of data in a 
study (e.g., direct or participant observations, semi-structured interviews etc.). On the other 
hand, external constraints refer to resources such as time and money. It might not be feasible 
for a researcher with limited resources to rely on more time consuming analytical strategies 
such as constant comparison or analytical induction.       
 The current study relied on typological analysis and was deductive, verificative, 
enumerative, and objective. However, the study also relied upon inductive thought process to 
discover subjective constructs during the intermediate-late stages of data analysis (see table 
2.5).  
Table 2.5: Characteristics of Typological Analysis in the Current Study 
Dimension Continuum Associated Dimension 
Induction-Deduction Data analysis was primarily deductive but induction was 
utilized for the discovery of some categories & relationships. 
Verification-Generation Data analysis was verificative in nature as interview data was 
used in support of study’s hypotheses.  
Construction-Enumeration Data analysis was enumerative. The units of analysis were 
defined as verbal episodes, that is, sentences or paragraphs 
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between the beginning and end of a specific topic (e.g., 
teamwork climate) on any given transcript.   
Subjective-Objective Data analysis primarily relied on researcher constructs (i.e., 
objective constructs), however, some participant constructs 
(i.e., subjective constructs) were also utilized.  
The typological analysis in the current study was implemented in 6 sequential steps 
adopted from Hatch (2002), LeCompte and Schensul (1999). In step 1, initial categories were 
identified from the Enabling, Enacting, and Elaborating Safety Culture Framework at the domain 
and factor levels. In step 2, each interview transcript was read completely with only one of the 
domain level category (e.g., safety climate) in mind and all places in the data were marked 
where evidence of this category was present. This was followed by reading only the data 
pertaining to a specific domain to isolate factor level categories. In step 3, data pertaining to 
each factor were analyzed separately in all transcripts for the discovery of sub-factor level 
constructs. In step 4, each interview transcript was re-read to ensure that the non-coded data 
did not contain important and/or contradictory information that should either be integrated 
into existed categories or coded into new categories. In step 5, relationships between the 
factor/sub-factor categories and safety outcomes were delineated. This process was guided by 
the information on these relationships from the research literature, study hypotheses, and 
declarations from interview participants. In step 6, direct quotes from different interview 
participants were selected to support the relationships that were discovered in the previous 
step.           
Triangulation: Combining Quantitative Results and Qualitative Findings 
 The concept of triangulation was adopted in the social sciences research from 
navigation where it refers to the use of two reference points to discover the location of an 
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object by forming a triangle (Jick, 1979; Thurmond, 2001). Initially, the concept of triangulation 
was applied in social sciences research as a test for validity of the measurement instruments 
(Moran-Ellis et al., 2006). This meant, the emergence of convergent findings from two or more 
data collection methods indicated the phenomenon of interest has been measured accurately 
while divergent findings indicated that one or more of the measurement instruments were 
defective. However, this narrow conceptualization of triangulation was untenable as qualitative 
and quantitative data collection methods often yield divergent findings. Eventually, the 
research community came to see these divergent results as representing complementary 
aspects or dimensions of a measured phenomenon and not a sign of flawed measurement 
instruments. In essence, the concept of triangulation has been broadened, whereby the 
presence of convergence increases confidence in the results while the emergence of divergent 
results is an opportunity to provide enriching alternative explanations of a phenomenon 
occurring in a complex multifaceted social world (Jick, 1979; Moran-Ellis et al., 2006).  
 The methodologic triangulation – combination of two or more data collection methods 
– can be classified into within-method and across-method triangulation (Thurmond, 2001). The 
within-method triangulation employs either quantitative or qualitative data collection methods. 
For example, a research study may rely upon focus groups and participant observations for 
within-method triangulation. On the other hand, across-method triangulation employs both 
quantitative and qualitative data collection methods. For example, a research study may rely 
upon interviews and closed-ended surveys for across-method triangulation. In addition to 
methodologic triangulation, three other common types of triangulation in social sciences 
research are data sources triangulation, investigator triangulation, and theoretical triangulation 
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(Denzin, 1970; Thurmond, 2001). Data sources triangulation examines the similarities and/or 
differences of findings in a given data collection method based on when (i.e., time), where (i.e., 
setting), and/or from whom (i.e., people) the data were collected. For example, data sources 
triangulation can be utilized in a focus group study on the coping strategies of different 
students (e.g., freshman vs sophomore) at different educational settings (e.g., community 
college vs university) during the final examination period. Investigator triangulation refers to 
the use of two or more interviewers, participant observers, and/or data analyst with different 
or complementary skills to minimize researcher bias during data collection, data analysis, and 
reporting of research findings. Theoretical triangulation refers to the use of two or more 
theoretical perspectives to investigate a phenomenon of interest.  
 The current study relied upon data sources triangulation to investigate instances of 
convergence and divergence in semi-structured interview findings across settings (i.e., ICU, ED, 
adult in-patient mental health, and general medicine) and professionals (i.e., nurses, allied 
health staff, and clerical staff). This was followed by the use of across method triangulation to 
investigate similarities and differences between survey results and interview findings.  
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Chapter 3: Results 
Quantitative Survey Results 
Response Rate 
 Table 3.1 shows the survey response rate for the current study. From September 30th, 
2015 to February 1st, 2016, a total of 245 surveys were distributed to frontline clinical staff at a 
large community hospital by the primary researcher. Of these 245 frontline clinical staff, 185 
staff returned a completed survey. Of these 185 returned surveys, 2 surveys were excluded (1 
from ED and 1 from Mental Health) from the study analyses as the respondents indicated they 
had worked for < 6 months on their clinical unit. As noted above, on rare occasions, a clinical 
staff that met the study’s inclusion criteria refused to take a survey being handed out by the 
primary researcher (2 from ICU, 1 each from ED and Mental Health).  These 4 individuals were 
included in the denominator for purposes of calculating the survey response rate (see Table 
3.1). 
The overall survey response rate was 74% (183/247), lending credibility to our study’s 
statistical inferences as there was relatively small potential for error due to non-response 
(Fowler, 2009). The survey response rates from intensive care unit, emergency department, and 
adult in-patient mental health were quite similar, ranging from 67% to 72% (see Table 3.1). The 
response rate at the general medicine unit was relatively higher than the other 3 clinical units. 
It is possible that the 92% survey response rate on the general medicine unit was facilitated by 
the physical space constraints of the unit – i.e., presence of semi-private patient rooms 
necessitated the charge nurse or the unit clerk to ask all the staff to gather for a quick huddle 
on most of the occasions when the primary researcher was on-site. These huddles made it 
easier for the primary researcher to build good rapport with staff and at the same time 
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provided the participants an opportunity to complete the survey on the spot. Staff huddles 
were also conducted at other clinical units to help facilitate survey data collection but these 
occurred less frequently compared to the general medicine unit.    
Table 3.1: Survey Response Rate by Clinical Unit  
 Distributed Refused 
Survey at 
Handout 
Returned Excluded Response Rate 
Intensive Care Unit 66 2 49 0 49/68 = 72% 
General Medicine 49 0 45 0 45/49 = 92% 
Emergency Department 88 1 60 1 59/88 = 67% 
Mental Health 42 1 31 1 30/42 = 71% 
Total 245 4 185 2 183/247 = 74% 
Sample Characteristics 
As shown in table 3.2, the survey sample consisted of 183 frontline clinical staff (i.e., 
nurses, allied health professionals, and unit clerks). Most of the survey respondents were 
females (89.6%), nurses (79.8%), < 41 years of age (56.9%), and had tenure of > 5 years on the 
unit (54.1%).  
Table 3.2: Demographic Information of the Whole Sample (N = 183) 
 Frequency Percent 
Tenure 6-24 months 24 13.1 
2-5 years 51 27.9 
> 5 years 99 54.1 
No response 9 4.9 
Total 183 100 
Age < 30 years 53 29 
31-40 years 51 27.9 
41-50 years 43 23.5 
> 51 years 31 17 
No response 5 2.7 
Total 183 100 
Gender Female 164 89.6 
Male 16 8.7 
No response 3 1.6 
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Total 183 100 
Profession Registered Practical Nurse (RPN) 21 11.5 
Registered Nurse (RN) 125 68.3 
Allied Health Professional (AHP) 18 9.8 
Clerical Staff 14 7.7 
No response 5 2.7 
Total 183 100 
 Furthermore, statistical analyses were carried out to test whether or not demographic 
characteristics (i.e., gender, profession, tenure, and age) of the survey respondents differed 
significantly across the 4 clinical units. The Fisher’s exact test showed that there were no 
significant differences in gender among the clinical units (p = .80 in table 3.3) – see Appendix 6 
for the SPSS output of the chi-square tests.    
 The study’s sample contained no RPNs in two of the clinical units (i.e., ICU and ED), 
consequently, categories of RPN and RN were collapsed into a single category, labelled nurses 
before running the contingency table analysis on profession by clinical unit. The Fisher’s exact 
test showed that there were no significant differences in profession among the clinical units, p 
= .10 – see table 3.3 and Appendix 6 for the SPSS output of the chi-square tests.  
Table 3.3: Demographic Information of the Sample at the Unit Level (N = 183) 
 ICU General 
Medicine 
ED Mental Health  
N Valid % N Valid % N Valid % N Valid % P-value 
Tenure 6-24 months 3 6.7 10 22.2 7 12.7 4 13.8 .001 
2-5 years 5 11.1 15 33.3 18 32.7 13 44.8 
> 5 years 37 82.2 20 44.4 30 54.5 12 41.4 
Age < 30 years 4 8.2 22 53.7 17 28.8 10 34.5 .003 
31-40 years 21 42.9 8 19.5 18 30.5 4 13.8 
41-50 years 12 24.5 7 17.1 14 23.7 10 34.5 
> 51 years 12 24.5 4 9.7 10 17 5 17.2 
Gender Female 43 87.8 38 90.5 55 93.2 28 93.3 0.80 
Male 6 12.2 4 9.5 4 6.8 2 6.7 
Profession Nurses 40 81.6 36 81.8 44 77.2 26 92.8 0.10 
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AHP 8 16.3 5 11.4 4 7 1 3.6 
Clerical Staff 1 2 3 6.8 9 15.8 1 3.6 
 A Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA showed that there was a statistically significant difference in 
tenure between the clinical units (chi-square = 16.10, df = 3, p = .001 in table 3.3). The Mann-
Whitney test, with significance levels corrected for multiple testing (Bonferroni correction) 
showed that tenure differed significantly between: a) ICU and General Medicine (Mann-
Whitney U = 627.50, p < .001), b) ICU and ED (Mann-Whitney U = 904.50, p = .036), and c) ICU 
and Mental Health (Mann-Whitney U = 395.50, p = .006). We did not find statistically significant 
differences in the other 3 pairwise comparisons – see Appendix 6 for the SPSS output of 
Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA.       
 A Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA showed that there was a statistically significant difference in 
age categories between the clinical units (chi-square = 14.11, df = 3, p = .003 in table 3.3). The 
Mann-Whitney test, with significance levels corrected for multiple testing (Bonferroni 
correction) showed that age differed significantly between ICU and General Medicine (Mann-
Whitney U = 551.00, p < .001). We did not find statistically significant differences in any of the 
other 5 pairwise comparisons – see Appendix 6 for the SPSS output of Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA. 
Missing Values Analysis (MVA) 
Frequency tables were used to examine the percentage of missing values per survey 
item. The percentage of missing values was found to be less than 3% for 33 out of 34 survey 
items. The percentage missing for survey item # 2 (i.e., tenure) was found to be 4.9%.  
MVA with EM estimation was conducted on all 34 survey items. We treated the 5 
demographic survey items (i.e., clinical unit, tenure, age, gender, and profession) as categorical 
and all other survey items as continuous. It is important to note here that EM estimation does 
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not impute values for demographic items/variables. The MVA was carried out on the whole 
data set and the “Little’s MCAR test” was found to be non-significant (p = .587). Consequently, 
it was appropriate to use EM estimation imputations for our data set. We generated frequency 
tables post imputation to ensure that all the inserted values fall within the expected range.   
Internal Consistency Reliability (Cronbach’s α)       
 The Cronbach’s α of all of the study’s main scales was found to be > 0.7 (see table 3.4). 
Overall patient safety grade consisted of a single survey item, consequently Cronbach’s alpha 
was not calculated for this particular variable. It was also examined whether the Cronbach’s α 
value of a scale improved with the deletion of a given item. It was found that the Cronbach’s α 
for the teamwork climate scale improved from 0.78 to 0.79 with the deletion of item 4d (i.e., 
“in this unit, it is difficult to Speak Up if I perceive a problem with patient care”). Similarly, 
Cronbach’s α for turnover intention improved from 0.89 to 0.91 with the deletion of item 5f 
(i.e., “I frequently think of quitting this job”). However, it was decided to retain both of these 
items because their deletion led to extremely marginal improvement in the Cronbach’s α value 
of their respective scale and both items have a strong theoretical rationale to be included in 
their respective scale (e.g., Alexander, Lichtenstein, Oh, & Ullman, 1998; Sexton et al., 2006a).     
Table 3.4: Cronbach’s α Values 
Scale Total # of Items Cronbach’s α 
Senior Leadership Support for Safety 4 0.87 
Supervisory Leadership Support for Safety 2 0.82 
Teamwork Climate 6 0.78 
Safety Organizing Scale 9 0.89 
Overall Perceptions of Patient Safety 4 0.81 
Turnover Intention 3 0.89 
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Simple Bivariate Analyses 
 First, we created scatter plots between study’s dependent variables (i.e., overall 
perceptions of patient safety, overall patient safety grade, and turnover intention) and 
independent variables (i.e., senior leadership support for safety, supervisory leadership support 
for safety, teamwork climate, and safety organizing scale) to visually examine their relationships 
(see Appendix 3). A positive linear trend was observed between overall perceptions of patient 
safety and each of the 4 independent variables. Similarly, a positive linear trend was observed 
between overall patient safety grade and each of the 4 independent variables. As expected, a 
negative linear trend was observed between turnover intention and each of the 4 independent 
variables. 
Second, simple bivariate analyses (Pearson r) were carried out to assess the strength 
and significance of relationships among the independent and dependent variables. As shown in 
table 3.5, bivariate analyses revealed significant relationships among the dependent and 
independent variables. Multicollinearity was not a concern since: (a) all of the study’s 
independent variables were correlated with each other at < 0.6, and (b) the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) score for each of the 4 independent variables was < 4 (Katz, 2006).  
Table 3.5: Means, Standard Deviations (SD), and Pearson r Correlations (N = 183) 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Senior Leadership  3.01 .94       
2. Supervisory Leadership 3.61 1.02 .492**      
3. Teamwork Climate 3.61 .67 .400** .598**     
4. SOS (7-pt scale) 4.34 .93 .252** .370** .520**    
5. Overall PS Perceptions 2.83 .87 .520** .404** .522** .317**   
6. Overall PS Grade 3.08 .87 .570** .468** .558** .387** .676**  
7. Turnover Intention 3.20 1.72 -.185** -.134* -.338** -.232 -.332** -.349** 
**p < .01, *p < .05. Scale means by unit are reported with histograms in Appendix 8.  
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Hierarchical Linear Regression Analyses 
Hierarchical Regression Analyses with Missing Data Imputations  
 Tables 3.6a, 3.6b, and 3.6c show the results of the three hierarchical regression analyses 
that examine the variance explained by the demographic (i.e., clinical unit, tenure, age, gender, 
and professional background) and explanatory variables (i.e., senior leadership support for 
safety, supervisory leadership support for safety, teamwork, and safety organizing scale) on 
overall perceptions of patient safety, overall patient safety grade, and turnover intention, 
respectively. 
Table 3.6a: Results of First Hierarchical Regression Analysis (DV = Overall Perceptions of PS) 
 Model 1, β Model 2, β Model 3, β 
Block 1 – Socio-Demographic Dummy Variables 
ICU .823*** .768*** .594** 
ED .073 .055 -.009 
Mental Health -.592** -.358 -.366* 
Tenure (2-5 Years) -.061 .002 .135 
Tenure (> 5 Years) -.435* -.280 -.180 
Age (< 30 Years) -.172 -.041 -.102 
Age (31-40 Years) -.174 -.095 -.116 
Age (41-50 Years) -.104 -.087 -.085 
Female -.298 -.123 -.095 
RPN .149 .354 .273 
RN -.180 .105 .078 
AHP -.013 .091 .191 
Block 2 – Leadership Support for Safety (i.e., Safety Climate) 
Senior Leadership  .403*** .336*** 
Supervisory Leadership  .013 -.102 
Block 3 – Frontline Clinical Staff Behaviours 
Teamwork Climate   .426*** 
SOS   .035 
Total R2 (adjusted) .203*** .373*** .441*** 
Change in R2 .261*** .165*** .069*** 
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***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. (N = 165). Reference groups: General Medicine, Tenure (6-24 
months), Age (> 51 years), Male, and Clerical Staff.  
The first hierarchical regression analysis shows that demographic variables, when 
entered in block 1 of the regression model, explain a statistically significant amount of variance 
in overall perceptions of patient safety (adj. R2 = .203, p < .001 in table 3.6a). However, only the 
β coefficients for ICU (β = .823, p < .001), mental health (β = -.592, p < .01), and tenure > 5 years 
(β = -.435, P < .05) in model 1 were significant. These β coefficient values indicate that overall 
perceptions of patient safety scores are: a) higher for ICU compared to the general medicine, 
adjusting for the other demographic variables, b) lower for mental health compared to the 
reference group, general medicine, and c) lower for tenure > 5 years compared to the reference 
group, tenure 6-24 months.  
Senior leadership support for safety and supervisory leadership support for safety, when 
entered in block 2 of the regression model, explain a statistically significant amount of variance 
in overall perceptions of patient safety (block 2 ∆R2 = .165, p < .001 in table 3.6a), over and 
above that which is explained by demographic dummy variables. However, only the β 
coefficient of senior leadership support for safety is significant (β = .403, p < .001).        
Finally, teamwork climate and safety organizing scale, when entered in block 3 of the 
regression model, explain a statistically significant amount of variance in overall perceptions of 
patient safety (block 3 ∆R2 = .069, p < .001 in table 3.6a), over and above that which is explained 
by independent variables entered earlier in the analysis. However, only the β coefficient of 
teamwork climate is significant (β = .426, p < .001). Overall, the first hierarchical regression 
analysis accounts for approximately 44% of the variance in overall perceptions of patient safety.   
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Table 3.6b: Results of Second Hierarchical Regression Analysis (DV = Overall PS Grade) 
 Model 1, β Model 2, β Model 3, β 
Block 1 – Socio-Demographic Dummy Variables 
ICU .887*** .810*** .656*** 
ED .331 .311* .250 
Mental Health -.491* -.188 -.184 
Tenure (2-5 Years) -.260 -.182 -.061 
Tenure (> 5 Years) -.333 -.142 -.046 
Age (< 30 Years) .041 .210 .156 
Age (31-40 Years) .027 .126 .115 
Age (41-50 Years) .358 .386* .375* 
Female -.302 -.089 -.062 
RPN .179 .423 .344 
RN -.057 .282 .264 
AHP -.152 -.022 .086 
Block 2 – Leadership Support for Safety (i.e., Safety Climate) 
Senior Leadership  .470*** .412*** 
Supervisory Leadership  .043 -.058 
Block 3 – Frontline Clinical Staff Behaviours 
Teamwork Climate   .327** 
SOS   .085 
Total R2 (adjusted) .195*** .438*** .490*** 
Change in R2 .254*** .232*** .054*** 
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. (N = 165). Reference groups: General Medicine, Tenure (6-24 
months), Age (> 51 years), Male, and Clerical Staff.  
The second hierarchical regression analysis shows that demographic variables, when 
entered in block 1 of the regression model, explains a statistically significant amount of variance 
in overall patient safety grade (block 1 adj. R2 = .195, p < .001 in table 3.6b). However, only the 
β coefficients for ICU (β = .887, p < .001) and mental health (β = -.491, p < .05) are significant. 
This indicates that overall patient safety grade scores are higher for ICU and lower for mental 
health when compared to the general medicine reference group, adjusting for the other 
demographic dummy variables. 
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Senior leadership support for safety and supervisory leadership support for safety, when 
entered in block 2 of the regression model, explain a statistically significant amount of variance 
in overall patient safety grade (block 2 ∆R2 = .232, p < .001 in table 3.6b), over and above that 
which is explained by demographic dummy variables. However, only the β coefficient of senior 
leadership support for safety is significant (β = .470, p < .001). 
Finally, teamwork climate and SOS, when entered in block 3 of the regression model, 
explain a statistically significant amount of variance in overall patient safety grade (block 3 ∆R2 
= .054, p < .001 in table 3.6b), over and above that which is explained by independent variables 
entered earlier in the analysis. However, only the β coefficient of teamwork climate is 
significant (β = .327, p < .01). Overall, the second hierarchical regression analysis account for 
approximately 49% of the variance in overall patient safety grade. 
Table 3.6c: Results of Third Hierarchical Regression Analysis (DV = Turnover Intention) 
 Model 1, β Model 2, β Model 3, β 
Block 1 – Socio-Demographic Dummy Variables 
ICU -.815 -.781 -.325 
ED -.615 -.604 -.424 
Mental Health .481 .339 .332 
Tenure (2-5 Years) -.039 -.076 -.436 
Tenure (> 5 Years) .518 .425 .144 
Age (< 30 Years) -.001 -.080 .080 
Age (31-40 Years) .237 .189 .226 
Age (41-50 Years) .346 .335 .361 
Female .054 -.051 -.130 
RPN -.731 -.854 -.623 
RN -.235 -.405 -.348 
AHP -1.549* -1.611* -1.924** 
Block 2 – Leadership Support for Safety (i.e., Safety Climate) 
Senior Leadership  -.240 -.067 
Supervisory Leadership  -.010 .291 
Block 3 – Frontline Clinical Staff Behaviours 
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Teamwork Climate   -.993*** 
SOS   -.229 
Total R2 (adjusted) .048 .051 .169*** 
Change in R2 .118 .015 .118*** 
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. (N = 165). Reference groups: General Medicine, Tenure (6-24 
months), Age (> 51 years), Male, and Clerical Staff.  
The third hierarchical regression analysis shows that demographic variables when 
entered in block 1 of the regression model do not explain a significant amount of variance in 
turnover intention (block 1 adj. R2 = .048, NS in table 3.6c), however, the β coefficient of AHP is 
shown to be statistically significant (β = -1.549, p < .05). This indicates that turnover intention 
scores for AHPs are lower (i.e., better) compared to the reference group, clerical staff.       
 Furthermore, senior leadership support for safety and supervisory leadership support 
for safety do not explain a significant amount of variance in turnover intention (block 2 ∆R2 
= .015, NS in table 3.6c), over and above that which is accounted by demographic dummy 
variables. 
Finally, teamwork climate and SOS, when entered in block 3 of the regression model, 
explain a statistically significant amount of variance in turnover intention (block 3 ∆R2 = .118, p 
< .001 in table 3.6c), over and above that which is explained by independent variables entered 
earlier in the analysis. However, only the β coefficient of teamwork climate is significant (β = 
-.993, p < .001). The β coefficient value of -.993 indicates that turnover intention decreases 
by .993 with every one-unit increase in teamwork climate. Overall, the third hierarchical 
regression analysis account for approximately 17% of the variance in turnover intention.  
In the current study, the proportion of missing values were low (i.e., < 5% per survey 
item) and data were missing at random, however, the sample size (N = 183) could be 
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considered relatively small. Consequently, hierarchical regression analyses were also run 
without missing data imputations and these results were found to be nearly identical to the 
results of hierarchical regression analyses with missing data imputations being reported in this 
section (see Appendix 7).  
Climate Profile 
 Table 3.7 shows mean (column A), standard deviation (column A), mean RWG (column B), 
and range of RWG values (column C) for each of the six study scales. Table 3.8 shows the upper 
and lower bound RWG values at each of the four participating clinical units. The upper bound 
unit RWG values approach or exceed .70 for all six scales at both ICU and ED. At the general 
medicine unit, the upper bound unit RWG values approach or exceed .70 for five of the six scales 
(i.e., senior leadership support for safety, teamwork climate, mindful organizing, overall 
perceptions of patient safety, and overall patient safety grade). However, at the adult in-patient 
mental health unit, only four of the six scales (i.e., senior leadership support for safety, 
teamwork climate, mindful organizing, and overall perceptions of patient safety) show 
sufficient inter-rater agreement (i.e., RWG > .69). The lower bounds of RWGs (Table 3.8, columns 
A-D, in parentheses) are quite a bit lower compared to the corresponding upper bounds of 
RWGs.  
Table 3.7: Scale Means, Standard Deviations (SD), and Range of RWG Values 
 A B C 
 Scale Mean (SD) Scale Mean RWG 
(lower bound)* 
Range of RWG (lower bound)* 
n = 4 units 
Senior Leadership  3.01 (0.94) 0.72 (0.28) 0.68–0.77 (0.08–0.49) 
Supervisory Leadership  3.61 (1.02) 0.65 (0.37) 0.54–0.80 (0.11–0.68) 
Teamwork 3.61 (0.67) 0.87 (0.65) 0.77–0.93 (0.19–0.88) 
Mindful Organizing 4.34 (0.93) 0.93 (0.87) 0.92–0.94 (0.85–0.90) 
Overall Perceptions of PS 2.83 (0.87) 0.78 (0.48) 0.71–0.83 (0.26–0.67) 
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 Safety climate shape on its own can also reveal important information about the climate 
personality of a clinical unit (Ginsburg & Oore, 2015). Figure 3.1 illustrates two examples where 
the participating clinical units had quite different safety climate shapes. The top two histograms 
show that the general medicine unit (mean = 3.07, RWG = .77) and the mental health unit 
(mean = 2.54, RWG = .69) had quite different climate shapes on perceptions of senior 
leadership support for safety. The shape of the climate perceptions at the general medicine unit 
can be classified as rectangular, whereas, it is bimodal in nature at the mental health unit. 
Similarly, the bottom two histograms show that ED and the mental health unit had quite 
different climate shapes (ED = normally distributed shape; mental health = bimodal shape) – 
Appendix 8 contains the complete set of histograms for senior leadership support for safety, 
supervisory leadership support for safety, safety organizing scale, teamwork climate, overall 
perceptions of patient safety, and overall patient safety grade. 
Overall PS Grade 3.08 (0.87) 0.67 (0.51) 0.49–0.78 (0.24–0.67) 
* Columns B & C report both the upper and lower bound (in parentheses) values of RWGs. The upper 
and lower bound values were calculated using rectangular and slightly skewed distributions, 
respectively. 
Table 3.8: RWG values at the Four Clinical Units 
 A B C D 
 ICU General 
Medicine 
ED Mental Health 
 RWG (LB)* RWG (LB)* RWG (LB)* RWG (LB)* 
Senior Leadership  0.68 (0.08) 0.77 (0.49) 0.75 (0.40) 0.69 (0.14) 
Supervisory Leadership  0.80 (0.68) 0.58 (0.21) 0.70 (0.46) 0.54 (0.11) 
Teamwork 0.93 (0.88) 0.88 (0.74) 0.89 (0.78) 0.77 (0.19) 
Mindful Organizing 0.94 (0.89) 0.92 (0.85) 0.94 (0.90) 0.92 (0.87) 
Overall Perceptions of PS 0.83 (0.67) 0.71 (0.26) 0.83 (0.66) 0.73 (0.34) 
Overall PS Grade 0.78 (0.67) 0.69 (0.53) 0.73 (0.59) 0.49 (0.24) 
* Columns A-D report both the upper and lower bound (in parentheses) values of RWGs. The upper 
and lower bound values were calculated using rectangular and slightly skewed distributions, 
respectively. 
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Figure 3.1: Illustrative Examples of Climate Shape Differences 
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Qualitative Interview Findings 
During the final qualitative analyses, one interview from ICU and one from ED were 
excluded as these interviewees did not met the study’s inclusion criteria (see table 3.9). 
Table 3.9: Total Number of Interviews per Clinical Unit.  
 Conducted Excluded Reason for Exclusion 
Intensive Care Unit 6 1 The interview conducted with the unit’s nurse 
educator was excluded as it was deemed to be 
a leadership position 
General Medicine 5 0  
Emergency Department 5 1 The interview conducted with an AHP was 
excluded as the participant had worked at ED 
for < 2 months at the time of the interview 
Mental Health 5 0  
Before the start of data analysis, an initial coding system was primarily developed from 
the theory (i.e., Enabling, Enacting, and Elaborating Safety Culture Framework) and contained 
two levels (i.e., domain and theme). Subsequently, most of the concepts at the sub-theme level 
were developed from the data during the coding process of interview transcripts (see table 
3.10).  
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The qualitative analyses revealed the importance of leadership, teamwork climate, and 
mindful organizing to safety outcomes – corroborating the survey results while also providing a 
more nuanced understanding of these concepts. The patterns or themes that emerged from 
this analysis are discussed in-depth below:   
Safety Climate 
Perceptions of senior leadership support for safety 
 The interviewees held negative perceptions of senior leadership support for safety on 
the four participating clinical units. More specifically, the data analyses revealed that the 
interviewees perceived that the senior leaders (a) primarily visit a clinical unit in case of a 
catastrophic safety event, (b) seldom communicate their vision about the hospital/unit clearly 
to the frontline clinical staff and (c) don’t include frontline clinical staff in policy making 
discussions. 
 The interviewees believed that senior leaders rarely visit the frontlines and when they 
do, it is usually in response to a catastrophic safety event. For example, ED’s nurse 2, 
commented:  
I heard they came down, I was not there that day but………..I know 
they did come down because…………staff got assaulted by patients 
and they did come down and had briefings and things like that 
after that situation happened………..I have worked here for 12 or 
13 years; I don’t think I have ever met any of the senior 
management in this hospital or had a chance to discuss anything 
with them so I feel they could probably come around a lot more 
down to emerg, especially when we constantly have bed 
crises………..and we are kind of like the frontline of the hospital. 
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  Similarly, poor visibility of senior leaders at the frontlines is highlighted by the following 
excerpt taken from an interview with an allied health professional (AHP 1) on the  general 
medicine unit:  
The trouble, I think from the corporate ladder, the highest that I 
ever see is the manager on this unit, so I don’t even know who else 
to talk to. Occasionally I see the director as of lately because 
accreditation is coming but the manager is the top that I would 
even see, I don’t see anyone higher up in that team to discuss 
anything with. So, they don’t have that big of a presence on this 
floor.  
 Similarly, mental health’s nurse 1, while supporting the assertion that senior leaders are 
primarily seen on the floor in case of a catastrophic safety event, also pointed out that the 
senior leaders need to communicate their vision for the unit/hospital to the staff much more 
clearly as shown by the following quote:  
I can think of twice, in my time here when the senior leaders been 
involved, in both times it was extremely violent incident. So, they 
were very serious events but other than that, no, not really. The 
director is not involved; they will come down and say there is a 
plan for expansion in ER, there is a plan for expansion of west 3 to 
increase the bed flow. We don’t really know what is going on, it’s a 
plan but we don’t know what is happening so I don’t really get a 
lot of input from upper management levels. 
In addition to clearly communicating their vision to the frontlines, the senior leadership 
must also demonstrate that they have taken the concerns of the frontline clinical staff into 
consideration while making decisions as the following quote taken from an interview with 
general medicine’s nurse 1 illustrates:  
There is a lot of, I find horizontal conversations happening but not 
a lot of top down communication. So, a lot of the feelings from 
nurses is that senior management have no idea about what is 
going-on on the floor so a lot of people feel that way because we 
don’t hear the background, we don’t hear what they are talking 
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about, we just see the very end result and they just say hey we are 
doing this. A lot of people on the floor don’t feel that like they are 
taking into account what we are saying because we don’t hear all 
the discussions that they are having in senior management 
meetings.  
 The mental health’s nurse 3 went even further and suggested the need for the frontline 
clinical staff to be included on committees creating hospital wide policies as highlighted by the 
following excerpt:  
A lot of the policies like the code white, the over sensing, it’s with 
input from the other stakeholders in the facility. So, it would be 
director from physical facilities, director from HR, director from 
child and adolescent, director from the medicine program that will 
all sit down and try to come up with ways to make the unit safe. 
But as they are trying to make the unit safe, or the patients safe, 
they’re not asking for the staff to comment or participate in those 
meetings where they created it………..unless you have frontline 
staff that are in those areas that are most effected by that policy, 
you’re never going to create a safe policy because you cannot sit in 
an office and not practice and not deal with the day to day ins and 
outs of the physical unit and know that that policy is an 
appropriate policy to implement. 
Perceptions of supervisory leadership support for safety 
There were positive perceptions of supervisory leadership support for safety at ED, ICU, 
and the general medicine unit. The staff at these clinical units saw their nurse manager as 
someone who (a) is approachable, (b) values staff expertise, (c) listens to staff concerns and (d) 
take those concerns into consideration while making decisions. For example, ED’s nurse 1 
commented:  
Our manager is really good, we had a change in our manager a 
couple of years ago, and it has changed the whole department I 
would say. Our manager is really good like when that incident 
happened, when that nurse got attacked, she had meetings after 
meetings with the staff to see what we needed……….she is really 
good at coming out on the floor, having daily huddles to check 
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things, to see what’s going on, updates us what’s going on 
manager side of things and checking in to see what is working and 
what is not working on the floor and that’s usually done once a 
day, ‘a huddle’ she calls it.  
Similarly, ED’s nurse 2 highlighted her positive perceptions of the nurse manager while 
describing an incident concerning a homeless patient as follows:  
I really like my manager, she is really approachable, to be honest. I 
feel comfortable with her, I feel like I can go to her, like the other 
day we had a patient and I felt like there was a lot of buck passing 
in his care. He was a homeless man, he couldn’t go back to the 
shelter, he needed a nursing home, they refused to admit him to 
the hospital so he was down in our emerg department for five days 
which seems a little inappropriate to me and then there were 
issues like getting his meds from the pharmacy because they only 
send those for admitted patients and the kitchen wouldn’t send 
him a warm meal because they only send warm meals for 
admitted patients. I went to the nurse manager and complained, 
passed on all my concerns about the patient. She was quite open 
to my concerns and how to fix what was happening………...my 
manager did call the food service and talked to their supervisor 
and talked to the pharmacy and kind of said, this is the situation 
and you need to appropriately change polices for this patient. 
On the same note, ICU’s nurse 3 pointed out that the nurse manager disseminates 
safety related information to staff on a regular basis and takes prompt action to alleviate safety 
concerns whenever possible as evident through the following excerpt: 
There is a huddle board that gets done, patient huddle board, for 
the most part it gets done on daily basis and there the nurse 
manager discusses what could be safety issues……….and you feel 
free to bring up anything you want to in-front of the group, so 
more suction equipment, sometimes that might be a safety issue. 
Now, ICU nurse manager have ordered some extra suction 
equipment so that we can have enough for patients in every room.  
A similar picture emerged at the general medicine unit as shown by the following 
excerpt from an interview with general medicine’s nurse 1: 
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Our manager is being very good at asking for feedback, ‘what are 
your ideas, what do you think we can do’, and she is actually pretty 
good at just making posts, she has this envelope where you can 
just put ideas in and every couple of weeks, she would write a 
response and post it at the nursing station…………our manager is 
very approachable.  
However, perceptions of interviewees on supervisory leadership differed across these 
three units (i.e., ED, ICU, and general medicine) when it came to provision of timely feedback to 
reported errors. At ED, there was a consensus among the interviewees that they receive timely 
feedback to reported errors from unit management. For example, ED’s nurse 2 commented on 
the quick response from the nurse manager to a reported medication error, “I think that 
happened in the middle of the night and my manager typically comes in at 7am and my shift 
ends at 7:30am and she came and talked to me about it before I left. So, I think, whenever I 
have submitted an incident report I have always heard back from management”. Similarly, ED’s 
nurse 3 mentioned, “I have submitted unsafe work forms before, when I felt that there were too 
many patients, they were too sick and we didn’t have time for our breaks………...and then our 
manager did come to me and say I got this, I just want to let you know that I have received this, 
we are working on it so she followed up”. 
In contrast, some of the interviewees from ICU and the general medicine unit expressed 
that feedback to reported medical errors is sometimes missing from the unit management. This 
lack of feedback occurred for minor events that caused no patient harm – this being a concern 
especially for patient falls at the general medicine unit. For example, general medicine’s nurse 2 
mentioned that feedback for reported patient falls is usually missing “unless it’s something that 
has really affected the patient then yes we do receive feedback. They ask about the situation 
and it depends how far the management wants to go with it but usually we don’t hear anything. 
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I think they use it mainly for statistics but I don’t know because I never ever had anybody follow 
up with me on someone that has fallen.” Similarly, general medicine’s AHP 1 commented that 
“falls happen pretty regularly…………so manager doesn’t come around if someone has a fall 
unless it is a catastrophic event…….…I think they need to be providing more feedback about 
falls…………that might inspire people to take those next steps to prevent or decrease the number 
of falls”.   
 There were negative perceptions of supervisory leadership support for safety at the 
adult in-patient mental health unit. The manager was seen by the nursing staff as someone who 
micro-manages the day-to-day functioning of the unit and seldom rely on the expertise of the 
frontline clinical staff while making decisions. Furthermore, a common concern was that the 
unit management doesn’t communicate effectively with the frontline clinical staff often 
resulting in a lack of timely feedback for reported errors even when those reported errors were 
considered as catastrophic events by the clinical staff. For instance, mental health’s nurse 1 
described an incident of a patient’s admission order being changed from the locked side to the 
open side of the unit by the manager without consulting the frontline clinical staff: 
A person was admitted to our open side, when he came up, the 
patient looked agitated with pacing, looked a little bit difficult to 
engage, wasn’t really saying a lot, making poor eye contact, 
looked like he was quite irritated………..so what he did was he got 
up and went to the room next to him where two females were and 
he was standing in the door way blocking their exit from the 
room……….when I asked him to leave………he escalated quite 
quickly to the point of agitation and possible violence. So, I called 
the doctor on call, who gave me the order to transfer him to the 
lock side of the unit…………but this patient was admitted to the lock 
side already, somehow that has changed to the open 
side…………...our manager was downstairs………...had talked to the 
patient and it seemed like through that conversation decided that 
he be okay for the open side when in fact he really wasn’t. We 
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weren’t told about it up here and the charge nurse on the floor 
wasn’t aware about it either………….my manager who is downstairs 
for five minutes then in a meeting and all over the hospital, is not 
the person to make those communication calls…………on the other 
side, the [ED] mental health nurse and the charge nurse up here 
should be communicating as to the status of the patient, the 
history, how they are presenting down in the emerg and to me 
that makes the most sense for the flow and then the charge nurse 
would communicate that among the rest of us…………so the overall 
effect on staff, they don’t feel valued, they don’t feel listened to, 
their assessments are worthless, doesn’t really matter what I say 
or do because it’s going to happen anyway.   
 Similarly, mental health’s nurse 4 vividly described the lack of timely debrief by the unit 
management in response to an extremely violent safety incident:  
They were running around here like chickens with their heads cut 
off, they didn’t know what they were doing. They needed to sit and 
talk to the people involved, that was a pretty big event…….it took 
me two and a half months to debrief with the people who were 
involved………why were we not debriefing about it Monday 
morning, bring the staff in who were involved, make sure they are 
well mentally, make sure they are ok physically, pay them overtime 
and let’s talk, not two and half months later…….the morale on this 
unit and the safety concerns on this unit are awful because of our 
manager. If I can get out of here and go someplace 
comfortable………I be gone because this place is an accident 
waiting to happen, it really is.  
 However, an outlier emerged at the adult in-patient mental health unit –  in contrast to 
her peers, mental health’s nurse 3 held overall positive views of the supervisory leadership 
support for safety and suggested that some of the frontline clinical staff do not communicate 
their concerns to the unit management effectively as evident through the following excerpt:  
I personally feel that management is working and doing as much 
as they can to keep the staff and the patients safe. They are open 
to our ideas; they really do try to help when we say to the 
management that the unit is really unpredictable………...they allow 
us to call extra staff if we think we need more staff……………they 
usually listen to me, I feel that they listen for the most part to the 
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staff and their needs……………I have even heard management say, 
‘we have done this this this and this, so what is it that we can do’, 
and it’s like, ‘well fix it’, there is not really a suggestion there from 
the staff so I am not sure what they are expecting. 
Teamwork Climate 
The data analyses revealed that interviewees differentiated between quality of 
teamwork climate within a clinical unit and across unit boundaries. Furthermore, distinction 
was made by the interviewees between inter-professional and intra-professional teamwork 
climate as discussed in-detail below. 
Perceptions of teamwork climate within a unit 
Intra-professional teamwork climate 
There were positive perceptions of intra-professional teamwork climate (e.g., nurse to 
nurse or physio to physio) on all 4 clinical units. For example, general medicine’s nurse 2 
commented, “I think as nurses we work very well as a team because we understand that it 
needs to be done as a team because that is the best way that the patient gets taken care of and 
the best way they feel heard and feel at ease being here”. Similarly, mental health’s nurse 4, 
while discussing teamwork climate, remarked that nurses rely on “good communication with 
each other……….at unit level. For us nurses, I think we are pretty cohesive. Some of us, we have 
to lead some of the newer staff………so you need to take the lead, that’s what you do but the 
communication beyond unit level, it’s crap, it’s atrocious”. 
On the same note, AHP 1 from ICU described the working relationship with her 
counterpart as honest and collaborative: 
The unit has two………[of us in my professional field] to take care of 
patients...……...one of the things nice about that is you always 
have somebody else that is looking at your work and we have a 
very honest relationship and we wouldn’t hesitant to say, ‘you miss 
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that’ or ‘I would have done that’ or ‘what do you think I could have 
done better?’ So, there are two heads all the time looking at 
something and ensuring that we are operating hopefully at the 
best level that we can.    
Inter-professional teamwork climate  
 The data analyses revealed that many of the interviewees from adult in-patient mental 
health, general medicine, and ED either believed that the quality of inter-professional 
teamwork climate needed further improvement or overtly described negative perceptions of 
inter-professional teamwork climate. This pattern was especially salient for the nurse-physician 
communication at general medicine and ED, whereby staff were of the view that certain 
physicians don’t communicate effectively with the nursing team and in doing so jeopardize 
safety of the patients. For example, a unit clerk from ED commented that “the physicians, some 
of them, especially the newer younger ones don’t appreciate how much knowledge some of the 
nurses, the more senior nurses have and aren’t as interested in taking some sage advice from 
someone who has been there and done that, that sort of thing”.  
Similarly, ED’s nurse 3 commented on a lack of good physician-nurse communication 
during resuscitation events: 
I do feel that sometimes there is a lack of……communication from 
the physician team and that they don’t communicate what their 
plan of care is with the nursing staff…….I find it really helpful when 
physician say, ‘ok we have this patient in here, they are this old, 
they have these comorbidities, I feel that this is a cardiac arrest 
related to BP and we are going to continue the resuscitation, we 
are going to get pulse check in two minutes’. When the physician 
speaks about what they are thinking, it just provides a whole lot of 
clarity for the team and we are not pulling in different directions. 
Often times the nurses, we are talking to each other, we are 
planning ahead which is good……but I feel that the physicians need 
to take the lead.  
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Furthermore, her comment also highlighted that the quality of nurse to nurse 
communication during resuscitation is usually good even if communication from the physician 
team is lacking.  
 On the same note, data analyses revealed that the quality of communication between 
nurses and allied health staff can be further improved exemplified by the following excerpts 
taken from interviews with a nurse and an allied health professional. The general medicine’s 
nurse 3 commented:  
I think with [AHPs]……sometimes there is lack of communication. I 
mean, nurses kind of stick together, we all work together, we see 
each other all the time so we are like little groups. I mean we try to 
communicate but sometimes you are so stuck on doing like fifty 
million things for your patients that you don’t really have time to 
go and talk to physio……about something that maybe is important 
but not that important. You are always prioritizing your time, like if 
I have a patient who cannot breathe, I am not going to be like 
‘hold on for a second, I am just going to talk to physio for that 
person who could be a falls risk’ or whatever.  
The general medicine’s AHP 1 acknowledged that the nurses are often pressed for time 
but emphasized the need to improve the flow of information to the allied health staff as they 
are only here “from Monday to Friday……and if someone have fallen during the weekend or 
fallen over night…….it is not charted consistently in any certain place, sometimes people have 
written on the chart, sometimes it is written in one area of the online charting, sometimes in 
another area and sometimes not at all. So, it is not communicated well to us”.  
 The nursing staff on the mental health unit needed to work along side police officers 
from time to time in order to provide care for the mental health patients, however, the 
interviewees commonly held negative perceptions of nurse-police teamwork climate. For 
example, mental health’s nurse 3 commented: 
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The boxed room………where we [keep] anybody that is in 
custody………does not have a bathroom. So, those police officers, if 
[the patient] gets up, they just let him walk through the unit. Well, 
there is a reason that you’re here to watch that fellow because 
he’s been a danger and you’ve charged him………and most often 
when they’re here, it’s because it’s an assault charge. So, if [a 
patient] is assaultive, and you’ve charged him………why are you 
letting him walk a hundred fifty feet to a bathroom by themselves 
in a general area without coming to the nursing staff and saying, 
‘you know, he wants to go to the bathroom’. 
Similarly, mental health’s nurse 4 described her negative perceptions of police response 
to an extremely violent safety incident on the unit:  
When the police got here, the police were awful because they said, 
‘well it’s part of your job, it is part of your job’, well it’s not part of 
our job. I have only twice been assaulted in my nursing career so it 
is not part of my job; it’s not an everyday event. I don’t go to work 
to get beat up…….so, keep in mind, you got security guards who 
can’t take this [patient] down, now the police are involved, he is 
shackled to a bed and restrained to a bed. We have to take him 
out of the restraints to let him use the bathroom because this guy 
is getting sicker and sicker, you cannot tie someone to the bed that 
long. He is filthy, he smells, the whole nine yards………you cannot 
keep someone tied up to a bed like that for days on end, that is 
what [the police] were doing. 
However, at both ED and the mental health unit, an outlier case emerged in regards to 
the quality of inter-professional teamwork climate on the unit. In both of these cases, the nurse 
interviewees held positive perceptions of nurse-physician teamwork climate in contrast to their 
peers. The ED’s nurse 2 commented:  
I have worked in every department in this hospital and I think 
emerg actually have the best communication within all the 
different professions because the nurses and the doctors work so 
close together in the emerg, you have to be able to have a good 
communication and you have to be able to speak to the doctor and 
he has to be able to trust the nurses.  
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Similarly, mental health’s nurse 2 commented that the communication between 
physicians and nurses is “exceptionally good on this unit………we spend a lot of time talking 
about the patients so I think they respect what feedback you have to give because you do have 
this more of a communication piece as opposed to physical caring for people on mental health 
so it is a little bit different that way, you work with the doctors in that way differently than 
another unit that focuses more on the physical aspects of the patients”. Interestingly, both of 
these nurses had a long tenure – The ED nurse had worked for 7 years and the mental health 
nurse for 26 years on their respective units at the time of the interview.  
On the other hand, consensus existed among the interviewees from ICU that clinical 
staff belonging to various professions worked well with each other on the unit. For example, 
ICU’s nurse 3 commented, “I definitely think that there is good communication and there is a 
good working relationship among the staff in ICU. I think everybody is very supportive, I think it 
adds patient safety for sure like everybody seems to look out for one another”. On the same 
note, AHP 1 from ICU labelled the inter-professional teamwork climate on the unit as 
“excellent” and commented: 
I couldn’t do what I do without [my team] because...……...I very 
rarely touch patients so...……...I look at the patient, I sometimes 
look at their feet, look at their skin, whatever, but I will go through 
the chart, I will talk to the doctor, talk to the nurse, talk to the 
pharmacist and create my care plan based on all the information 
and then my care plan goes to the team and then the team 
implements it, the nurse and the pharmacist primarily or the 
physician if they have to put a tube in because I don’t deliver feeds, 
I don’t hang IVs...……...so, the fact that I have a team is crucial, I 
couldn’t care for people without them because I need all their 
input and then I need them to implement the plan that I develop 
based on everyone’s input.   
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The role of tenure 
The qualitative analyses also revealed that the presence of newer or inexperienced staff 
can compromise the quality of teamwork climate on a clinical unit. For example, ED’s nurse 2 
commented:  
When you get a lot of newer nurses who don’t know the doctors, 
the doctors don’t know the nurses, there always is a bit of an 
adjustment period where you need to learn about each other, 
learn how to speak to each other and learn to trust each 
other………we also use a lot of agency staff here because when 
people call in sick, you have to have somebody to look after these 
patient so then we have somebody here for 12 hours, they never 
been here before, they are not invested in the hospital or the place, 
they don’t know the doctors, they don’t know the staff and 
then….it is a bit difficult for them and for the doctors and the staff 
for an hour or two with the communication.  
The following excerpt taken from the interview with general medicine’s nurse 2 paints a 
similar picture with regards to tenure and its associated influence on quality of teamwork 
climate: 
It is harder for newer staff members coming on to this unit, they 
don’t know people; they don’t know who they can talk to so I being 
here for four years I know who I can talk to and how to get things 
done that I need get done and I know if I have concerns whom to 
talk to but a new staff member I think will probably have a hard 
time with that because they don’t know anybody so they don’t 
know who they can talk to which would then be a patient safety 
concern because they are trying to manage everything on their 
own and you cannot do that on the floor.  
On the same note, mental health’s nurse 3 while discussing the relationship between 
staff tenure and communication commented that when on a given shift “you’ve got 3 staff 
members that are recent to nursing in general and you have 1 or 2 that are new to mental 
health………...the communication skills are not going to be there because the ones that are fresh 
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and new to the unit are unconfident and uncomfortable in bringing to light something because 
they don’t know how it’s going to be interpreted”. 
The role of patient-nurse ratio 
A key finding that emerged from the semi-structured interviews was that staff had much 
better perceptions of teamwork climate at ICU compared to the other three participating units. 
The ICU’s nurse 3 who had previously worked at the general medicine unit implied that nurse-
patient ratio may explain the differences in perceptions of teamwork climate between clinical 
units as shown by the following excerpt: 
 “Medicine [unit] is where I worked for years previously before 
coming here and you see differences of people working together 
on these units. Sometimes up on the medicine unit, where there is 
a higher ratio of patients and very minimal staff, it was hard to 
support one another. People got tired and it was just different; the 
physicality of the job was much heavier……...here you have a unit 
of about 10 beds which is far better than a unit of 35 beds up there 
with only 7 to 8 staff on days. Here you just have more people if 
you need to grab people, which is what it should be.  
Indeed, the general medicine’s AHP 1 commented that over-worked nursing staff 
sometimes ignore her treatment recommendations and put the safety of patients at risk: 
Sometimes people feel rushed and over worked. So, one of my 
roles is to assess a patient’s mobility and then we have our own 
communication notes that go above……...the bed but sometimes 
what I found that if I am recommending that a  patient use a 
mechanical lift or two people to transfer, sometimes the team is, 
‘oh I am too busy to get that, I will just throw them back into the 
bed’ essentially, not in those words, but it is easier to muscle 
through things sometimes than to do it in actual recommended 
safe manner since there is no time for people to go get it, bring it 
back, hook it all up so that is a component………I think if you have 
more staff on the floor to support these heavy care need patients 
then there be more eyes on people, more help to actually mobilize 
patients so that would reduce the risk of people falling out of bed.    
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Perceptions of teamwork climate across clinical boundaries 
 The quality of teamwork climate across unit boundaries was only brought up in the 
context of intra-hospital patient transfers – primarily patient transfers from ED – and the 
process was described as “poor” by the clinical staff. For example, ICU’s nurse 2 discussed the 
difficulty she experienced trying to communicate with physicians from another unit concerning 
a patient who had experienced a medical error: 
We had a patient that…….was given a………very large dose of 
medication at an hourly rate through a miscalculation………she was 
a patient that was what we call bed space from another 
unit………..[so] another service supposed to care for this patient 
and there was no physician that would readily take responsibility 
for this patient………I had to end up finally going to several layers 
of physicians and finally………to chief of medicine and she was the 
one who finally took patient care on that. 
 The teamwork climate across clinical unit boundaries was especially an area of concern 
for interviewees from the adult in-patient mental health unit. They felt that clinical staff from 
ED lacked understanding about the complexity of treating mental health patients and were 
prone to provide incomplete information during patient transfers. For instance, mental health’s 
nurse 4 commented: 
You got staff downstairs who have no clue what we do up 
here……...they don’t get it nor do they want to get it, everything 
revolves around the emergency room, you cannot assess 
somebody in a 20-minute period and decide what you want to do 
with them, it takes some time. They are constantly pushing, 
pushing, pushing and then when you call them to try to get 
information, the left hand doesn’t know the right, like if I call for a 
report from an ED nurse, they don’t even know who their patients 
are, they don’t know the mental health act, they don’t know 
anything about mental health.  
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Similarly, mental health’s nurse 5 vividly described an incident where she received 
insufficient information from ED during a patient’s transfer: 
I was taking in an admission for patient from down in the 
emergency department…….it was a regular ED nurse who had this 
patient and she gave me a report, it was pretty brief. She didn’t 
say very much, she told me that ‘he is calm and cooperative, 
nothing is wrong with him’………and after I hung up with her, I 
realized that I didn’t get a very good report so I tried to call back 
down for another report, nobody answered. So, I had to page my 
manager, she called down to the emergency to talk to their 
manager but in the process of this all happening, the patient 
arrived [up here] on the unit while I was waiting to get a better 
report.  
There was only one instance where an interviewee from the emergency department 
talked about her perceptions of teamwork climate between staff from ED and mental health 
unit. The ED’s nurse 1 mentioned that the use of psychiatric emergency nurses on ED has 
improved the quality of communication between the two units as shown by the following 
quote: 
The psychiatric emergency nurse are actually mental health unit 
nurses that work down here………...they worked up on the mental 
health, they know what goes on that floor, they know what goes 
on the emerg so they are kind of back and forth between. Usually a 
pen nurse is assigned to those four mental health beds here plus 
an ER nurse, so the ER nurse will do all the blood work, ECGs, kind 
of more medical things and the pen nurse will look after more 
psychiatric issues………this is kind of recent, the last couple of years 
we don’t have that pen nurse there so that kind of really help with 
the communication with the mental health floor.  
Mindful Organizing  
The semi-structured interview questions and associated probes didn’t directly solicit 
information about the 5 processes of mindful organizing. However, data analyses revealed the 
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presence of three of these processes while the interviewees were discussing their perceptions 
of teamwork climate and leadership support for safety.  
Principles of Anticipation 
Preoccupation with Failure 
 Data analyses revealed two specific themes concerning preoccupation with failure: (a) 
identification and reporting of errors by frontline clinical staff and (b) nurse manager’s feedback 
to those reported errors. There was a consensus among the interviewees from all participating 
units that the frontline clinical staff are good at identifying and reporting near misses and 
medical errors irrespective of patient harm. For example, ED’s nurse 2 commented: 
Our jobs require us to be completely 100% accountable for all 
errors so if you notice that something has happened, you need to 
tell the appropriate people. Like I once…………gave the wrong 
medication to the wrong patient, realized it as soon as they have 
popped it in their mouth and swallowed it, ‘oh god this is the 
wrong person’ and I have to go and tell the doctor that I have 
given this person this medication and go from there.  
Similarly, general medicine’s nurse 2 mentioned that the nursing staff “report any 
incidents that happen to patients………...even if it was a near miss, even if they have fallen and 
we saw them fall, it was a witness thing, we still fill out an incident report. If they fall and 
nothing is wrong with them you still fill out the incident report, if they fall and got a skin tear or 
have a laceration on their head we fill it out and it’s not just for falls either”.  
 On the same note, ICU’s nurse 1 mentioned that the nursing staff report all sorts of 
errors to the online incident reporting system irrespective of the extent of patient harm, 
“whether it would be………a needle stick, a fall, anything, we report it………even if somebody has 
a pressure wound…………we report it.” Similarly, mental health’s nurse 2 described the multi-
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layered reporting process that the nursing staff engage in when a patient falls on the unit floor 
as follows:  
The manager……….is made aware; the charge nurse is made 
aware; the doctor, the following day as long as it is nothing that 
you have to attend to right away, as long as it is not a bad 
fall………...unless it is something they break that needs immediate 
attention and couldn’t wait till the following day then you would 
have to make those constant decisions.     
 There were differences across the four clinical units regarding staff perceptions of nurse 
manager’s feedback to reported errors as evident through the quotations provided above in the 
section pertaining to supervisory leadership support for safety. At ED, the interviewees believed 
that the nurse manager provides timely feedback to all types of reported errors or incidents. At 
ICU and general medicine unit, the interviewees perceived a lack of feedback to reported minor 
safety events – errors or incidents that didn’t cause patient harm – from the nurse manager. At 
mental health unit, the interviewees perceived that the feedback from unit management is 
often missing for reported minor safety events and sometimes delayed for serious safety 
events. 
Principles of Containment 
Commitment to Resilience 
 The interviews revealed that on occasions the frontline clinical staff found themselves 
faced with unexpected events (e.g., a patient fall or administration of a wrong medicine) but in 
almost all such cases they were able to successfully manage the unexpected event in real time. 
This pattern was observed on all four participating clinical units. For example, ED’s nurse 2 took 
swift action when she realized that she had administered wrong drug to a patient:  
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I once had a patient, because it’s crazy in the fast-track zone and 
you have you know forty patients at once in there, and I gave the 
wrong medication to the wrong patient, realized it as soon as they 
have popped it in their mouth and swallowed it, ‘oh god this is the 
wrong person’ and I have to go and tell the doctor that I have 
given this person this medication and go from there, monitor the 
patient. It turned out to be quite fine, it was like giving the wrong 
patient Tylenol but still it could potentially cause damage to the 
patient if they have allergy to Tylenol or that kind of thing. 
Similarly, general medicine’s nurse 3 highlighted the nursing staff commitment to 
resilience when she described her team’s quick response to a patient fall:  
It was shift change, we were going to go home and the patient in 
[one of the rooms] was found on the floor………..so, we all rushed in 
there, of-course somebody said ‘I need help in here’ because they 
found him on the floor, we all rushed in there and we all helped, 
you know two nurses would grab one side and two another side, 
then we picked him up and we put him back in bed and we took his 
vitals to make sure that he is ok…………make sure there is nothing 
broken…………..make sure that there are no major 
injuries………….then we have procedures, we have to do incident 
report, we have to call the doctor and tell the charge nurse to 
inform them about the fall. 
 On the same note, the nursing staff commitment to resilience was evident when it was 
discovered that a patient has received a drug overdose – ICU’s nurse 2 vividly described the 
drug overdose event:  
We had a patient that………..was given a…………very large dose of 
medication at an hourly rate through a miscalculation………….she 
was a 42-year-old woman………….she had heparin running 150 cc 
per hour, it was horrific amount of heparin………….I was getting 
report as a charge nurse and then I just got up and said like ‘we 
need to stop, I have to go deal with this’ as the nurse was coming 
out of the room and saying ‘what is happening this is running at 
100 [cc per hour]’………..and so then the two of us start phoning 
the physicians, and of-course stop the heparin drip immediately 
and I said to the primary nurse, ‘don’t touch her, don’t remove any 
lines, she is not allowed to get out of bed, like don’t let her do 
anything until this just has to wear off’. She just has to metabolize 
90 
 
the drug……… and I had to end up going to several layers of 
physicians and I finally had to go to chief of medicine and she was 
the one who finally took patient care on that.  
 Similarly, mental health’s nurse 5 described an incident where a psychotic patient was 
initially misdiagnosed at the emergency department before being transferred to the open or 
less secured side of the mental health unit and then how the nursing team had to manage the 
unexpected situation in real time to move the patient to the closed or more secured side of the 
unit: 
I.………sat down and talked to him and within couple of minutes of 
talking to him I realized that he was horribly psychotic, he was 
having delusions that there were people watching him on the 
cameras; he thought the TV was watching him. He was found 
about ten minutes later after I went to the nursing station to try to 
contact my manager……….to get him move over to the closed side 
of the unit, he was found in……….a female patient’s room and he 
was just standing at the end of her bed, staring at her and this is a 
patient who has had sexual abuse in the past so that deters her 
recovery when she is trying to get better………we went to go get 
the psychotic patient out of her room and then he was trying to 
get out of the doors, he first was pulling on the patio door and 
then he went to the exit door and he was pulling on those trying to 
get out……….I was speaking with him, another nurse……..went on 
the nursing station and started getting medication ready while 
couple of us were still talking to the patient, trying to convince him 
to come over willingly to the closed side without having to put 
hands on him or call a code white and another nurse went to check 
on the medication and got that ready and an injection, just in case 
he wouldn’t take the pill. Once we had him over there, the other 
nurse came with medication and it kind of just fell together that 
way.   
The role of education or training 
 A consensus emerged across all participating clinical units that the capabilities for 
resilience can be improved by providing the frontline clinical staff more educational and/or 
training opportunities. For example, ED’s nurse 3 commented that her clinical team’s response 
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to emergency codes (e.g., code blue, code white etc.) can be improved through simulation 
training:  
I feel that we will benefit from having practice codes and I read 
some literature where hospital and emergency teams who go 
through repetitive practice arrest situations, perform far better 
and the communication is far better………...for example, running 
through practice code blue would really enhance our team work, 
our communication in a code environment…………the unit 
management should be given permission from upper management 
to have in house education days, mandatory for staff and we are 
provided with the time off. Or have it on our scheduled days and 
then get coverage so that we can be away from the department.     
Similarly, ICU’s nurse 3 commented on the need for more education and training for the 
frontline clinical staff: 
I think there could be more education and more training. So, we 
got some new monitors in here a few months ago, and it seems 
that they drop the monitors off, the bedside monitors, and they 
left. So, definitely some more training on things like the monitors, 
even some review topics like human dynamics or ventilators or 
current studies on…………ventilator-associated 
pneumonia………...would be nice. 
On the same note, general medicine’s nurse 2 mentioned that lack of in-house 
educational opportunities can put patients at risk, “We have some high-risk medications, where 
people are not doing the lines properly, like a heparin line with a rescue line………so that is a 
danger to the patient so we tell our educators that we need more education on these things so 
that everybody is on the same page and we don’t get any follow up.” Similarly, mental health’s 
nurse 3 commented that a lack of crisis prevention intervention training can jeopardize a 
clinical team’s ability to manage and bounce back from a safety incident: 
If you’re not trained to interpret the little bits of what’s going on, 
or to intervene, because you don’t have crisis prevention 
intervention training…………how is that safe for the patient? How is 
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that safe for the unit?...............even if you communicate with your 
[colleagues], okay you need to watch patient H because he’s 
irritable, didn’t sleep, is refusing medications and you let whether 
it’s the personal support worker, or the float nurse, whether it’s 
the agency nurse………know that………you can communicate all you 
want but if they do not have that training, they’re not going to 
understand. 
Deference to Expertise 
Two specific patterns emerged regarding deference to expertise during analyses of the 
semi-structured interviews. First, interviewees from ED and the general medicine unit believed 
that some of the physicians don’t defer to nurse’s expertise during a bed-side crisis, thereby 
risking the safety of patients. For instance, the following excerpt from the interview with ED’s 
nurse 3 highlighted how a lack of deference to nurse’s expertise can compromise patient 
safety: 
I had a patient who was having difficulty breathing and going into 
congestive heart failure or symptoms of what looked like 
congested heart failure…...it was at night time and this physician 
often leaves early and I have interactions with him before where I 
have questioned his orders and he has been quite rude to me. So, I 
called him and I asked if I can give the patient some medicine to 
help with her breathing and also get a chest X-ray. He was quite 
rude on the phone, didn’t finished listening to my request and then 
hung up on me…………this is also the physician who ordered a 
blood thinner for a patient of mine with a basal skull fracture and I 
refused to give. I called him several times to clarify orders, I called 
to see if I can give him something for pain, he said ‘yes’, then I 
called back to clarify, ‘are you sure you want me to give him 
heparin, he got a skull fracture’ and he said ‘yes give the heparin 
and make sure you think next time before you call me’ and then 
hung up.  
Similarly, general medicine’s nurse 2 commented that, “some physicians 
probably……think that they know the patient better than we do……which is not fair because we 
spend 12 hours a day with them, they spend may be 20 minutes……it is not beneficial to the 
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patient in the long run when they don’t listen to us when we got a concern, it may be a gut 
feeling but there is a genuine concern”.  
 A second pattern regarding deference to expertise emerged at the mental health unit 
where the interviewees were of the view that the unit management don’t defer to the 
expertise of the frontline clinical staff during a bed side crisis, thereby putting the safety of staff 
and patients at risk. For instance, mental health’s nurse 4 talked about her frustration when the 
unit management ignored the frontline clinical staff recommendation to move a patient that 
instigated an extremely violent incident to a stand-alone psychiatric hospital:  
Our management team……...they did not listen to the staff, I have 
done this job for a lot of years, I came from a psychiatric mental 
health centre, they have every violent offender there, I said that he 
needs to be transferred there now, nobody listened………the 
management had no idea how to handle this, it was like they were 
wading through and learning as they were going. Listen to the 
staff who tell you, the guy got to go, send him to jail, we all said 
forensic, he’s got to go, it’s [an extremely violent] incident, call the 
police……….so, they put staff repeatedly at risk as well as all the 
other patients just for one guy who should have been the hell out 
of here, like quickly.  
It is important to note here that the topic of deference to expertise during a crisis 
situation was not brought up by any of interviewees from ICU.      
 In summary, the qualitative data analyses showed that the interviewees perceived a lack 
of support for safety from senior leaders at all participating clinical units. The interviewees were 
of the view that the hospital’s senior leaders need to be more visible at the frontlines, 
communicate their vision about the hospital much more clearly and involve frontline clinical 
staff in policy making discussions. 
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The interviewees from ED, ICU, and the general medicine unit held positive perceptions 
of supervisory leadership support for safety – the only exception being the perception of a lack 
of manager’s feedback to minor events or near misses at ICU and the general medicine unit. In 
contrast, at the adult in-patient mental health unit, two distinct groups emerged that held 
strongly opposing views on supervisory leadership support for safety. On the one hand, the 
majority of interviewees had negative perceptions of nurse manager’s support for safety while 
on the other an outlier held positive views on supervisory leadership support for safety. In 
general, the frontline clinical staff preferred participative or supportive nurse managers, who 
are approachable, value staff expertise, provide timely feedback and take staff concerns into 
consideration while making decisions compared to directive nurse managers who micro-
manage and seldom rely on the expertise or opinions of the frontline clinical staff while making 
decisions.  
 The data analyses revealed that the staff perceptions of teamwork climate are strongly 
influenced by profession and unit boundaries. Within unit boundaries, the interviewees held 
positive perceptions of intra-professional teamwork climate on all participating clinical units, 
whereas, staff perceptions of inter-professional teamwork climate were primarily negative on 3 
out of 4 clinical units – ICU being the exception where interviewees believed that clinicians 
belonging to different professions worked well as a team on the unit. Lastly, interviewees from 
the participating units suggested that the presence of newer or inexperienced staff as well as 
high patient to nurse ratio can compromise the quality of teamwork climate on a clinical unit.  
The interview questions and associated probes solicited information on within unit 
teamwork climate, however, some interviewees from mental health and ED talked about the 
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quality of teamwork climate between these two specific units – those from mental health 
described it as poor while those from ED believed that it has improved significantly over the 
past few years.  
Similarly, the semi-structured interviews did not directly solicit information about 
mindful organizing. However, data analyses revealed themes pertaining to three out of five 
processes of mindful organizing – preoccupation with failure, commitment to resilience, and 
deference to expertise. First, the interviewees believed that frontline clinical staff report near 
misses and errors irrespective of patient harm but feedback from a nurse manager is not always 
forthcoming or timely. Second, there were numerous examples in the interviews of frontline 
clinical staff commitment to resilience on all four clinical units. Furthermore, it was suggested 
by interviewees that staff capabilities of resilience can be improved by providing frontline 
clinical staff more on-site educational and training opportunities. Third, the interviewees 
suggested that patient safety is jeopardized whenever a physician or a nurse manager does not 
defer to the expertise of the frontline nursing staff during a bedside crisis.      
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
Safety Climate 
The survey results partially supported hypothesis 1a as staff perceptions of senior 
leadership support for safety were shown to be positively and significantly associated with 
overall patient safety perceptions and overall patient safety grade. These survey results were 
corroborated by the qualitative findings as interviewees highlighted the importance of 
supportive senior leaders to safety outcomes at the frontlines.  
Much of the empirical research in healthcare settings has focused on safety behaviours 
of senior leaders that can improve employees’ climate perceptions such as leadership styles 
(e.g., Yun, Faraj, & Sims, 2005), executive safety walk-rounds (e.g., Frankel et al., 2008; Thomas 
et al., 2005), adopt-a-work unit (e.g., Pronovost et al., 2004), and frontline safety forums (e.g., 
Tucker et al., 2008). In contrast, empirical research that has tried to directly examine the 
relationship between employees’ perceptions of senior leadership and safety outcomes is 
lacking – see Mardon et al., (2010) for an exception. However, the positive impact of supportive 
senior leaders on patient and staff outcomes can be inferred from empirical research – e.g., 
employees’ positive perceptions of executive leaders are significantly associated with higher 
nurse job satisfaction (Cummings et al., 2010) while higher nurse job satisfaction has been 
associated with significantly lower patient mortality rates (Aiken et al., 2002) and nurse 
turnover intention (Hayes et al., 2012).  
The survey results found that the association between perceptions of senior leadership 
support for safety and self-reported turnover intention was non-significant. The turnover 
theory suggests that an employee’s decision to leave his/her department or organization is 
primarily influenced by that employee’s immediate work characteristics (Galletta, Portoghese, 
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Battistelli, & Leiter, 2012) – implying that distal organization level characteristics such as senior 
leadership support for safety may have limited impact on a clinician’s turnover intention when 
compared with more immediate unit level characteristics. Indeed, empirical studies in 
healthcare settings have shown that employees’ turnover intentions are primarily influenced by 
individual level (e.g., age, tenure) and unit level (e.g., workload, staffing, supportive unit 
supervisor) characteristics (e.g., Galletta, Portoghese, Penna, Battistelli, & Saiani, 2011; Hayes 
et al., 2012).  
The survey results did not support hypothesis 1b as the relationships between staff 
perceptions of supervisory leadership support for safety and the three self-reported safety 
outcomes were shown to be non-significant. However, interviewees across all participating 
clinical units emphasized the importance of supportive frontline managers to staff and patient 
safety outcomes. In addition, both interviewee participants and survey respondents, on 
average, held more positive perceptions of supervisory leadership support for safety compared 
to senior leadership support for safety (see table 3.9 – supervisory leadership’s mean = 3.61 
and senior leadership’s mean = 3.01).       
Study data showed some inconsistency between qualitative findings and quantitative 
results on supervisory leadership support for safety.  However, it is also important to note here 
that the survey solicited staff perceptions of manager’s proactive safety behaviours (e.g., my 
supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she sees a job done according to established 
patient safety procedures) while the questions/probes for the interviews were reactive – i.e., 
solicited staff perceptions of a manger’s safety related actions in response to a safety incident – 
perhaps causing the survey and interview to capture different aspects of the same 
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phenomenon. Furthermore, the survey items for supervisory leadership focused on only two 
aspects of a manager or supervisor’s role: (a) encouragement of clinical staff to follow 
established patient safety procedures and (b) taking into consideration staff suggestions for 
improving patient safety. However, the qualitative findings suggested that the clinical staff 
perceived the safety related responsibilities of a supervisor in much broader terms – for 
example, the ability of a supervisor to provide timely feedback regarding reported errors was 
seen by interviewees as a central aspect of supervisory leadership support for safety. There is in 
fact ample empirical evidence in the healthcare literature for the positive effect of supportive 
supervisors or frontline leaders on patient and staff safety outcomes. For example, nursing staff 
perceptions of supportive managers have been associated with significantly lower patient 
mortality, medication errors, patient falls, patient infection rates, and nursing turn-over in 
hospital settings (Capuano, Bokovoy, Hitchings, & Houser, 2005; Houser, 2003; Wong, 
Cummings, & Ducharme, 2013).  Future examinations of supervisory leadership for safety 
would benefit from broader operationalizations of supervisory leadership for safety than the 
measure used in the current study. 
Mindful Organizing 
Hypothesis 2 was not supported by the survey results as the associations between 
safety organizing scale (SOS) and the three outcome variables was found to be non-significant. 
In comparison to the current study, all previous empirical research on SOS had utilized larger 
sample which increases the likelihood of detecting significant associations among variables 
(Kerlinger & Lee, 2000). Furthermore, the current study contained a relatively large number of 
variables – unlike the past empirical studies on SOS – potentially limiting the amount of unique 
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variance accounted for by SOS in the hierarchical regression analyses. In addition, the 
qualitative findings of the current study show that senior and supervisory leaders primarily 
rewarded staff for compliance with established safety protocols and rarely for extra-role safety 
behaviours suggesting that perhaps many of the frontline clinicians were either unaware of or 
did not appreciate the importance of extra-role safety behaviours that underpin the safety 
organizing scale.  In other words, high reliability theory and the components of mindful 
organizing may not yet be part of frontline providers’ lexicon to the extent that leadership 
support for safety is. 
The semi-structured interview questions and associated probes did not directly solicit 
information about mindful organizing; however, data analyses revealed the presence of some 
interesting themes associated with processes of mindfulness. First, it emerged that on 3 out of 
4 clinical units, the management rarely responded strongly to weak signals of failures, that is, 
near misses or safety events causing no patient harm, rarely elicited feedback from unit 
management. The importance of managerial response to safety failures is increasingly 
supported in the literature.  In a theoretical paper, Kaplan and Fastman (2003) pointed out that 
compared to adverse events resulting in patient harm, near misses and no-patient harm 
incidents provide greater opportunities for organizational learning and systems’ improvement 
as such events occur more frequently, contain richer information content for failure/learning 
analyses, and permit examination of organizational capabilities to prevent incidents from 
escalating into patient harm adverse events – consequently, error reporting systems must be 
able to capture near misses and no-patient harm events while administration’s feedback needs 
to be timely to motivate clinicians to report such events. Indeed, empirical evidence showing 
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that timely and appropriate feedback for reported errors is an integral part of an effective 
incident reporting system has started to emerge. For example, Benn et al. (2009) conducted 
semi-structured interviews with safety management experts from high risk industries (e.g., civil 
aviation, offshore production, healthcare, and energy) to glean knowledge about the 
characteristics of effective safety feedback for incident reporting. Their thematic analyses 
suggested that following an incident report, it is crucial to immediately start a dialogue with the 
original reporter to assure the employee that the report will be acted upon. Moreover, the 
safety feedback must be continuous, that is, all employees including the original reporter must 
be kept apprised of event analysis results and any solutions implemented to alleviate the 
problem. Karsh et al. (2006) used a focus group design to elicit perceptions of family physicians, 
nurses, and clinical assistants on a variety of topics related to the design and implementation of 
a medical error reporting system – e.g., purposes and format of a reporting system, barriers 
and motivators for error reporting. The inductive analysis of the focus groups revealed that 
participants perceived the presence of instantaneous and continuous feedback as a key 
motivator for error reporting. Similarly, a cross sectional survey study carried out in six 
Australian hospitals showed that perceived lack of feedback was the most frequently cited 
barrier to error reporting by both doctors and nurses (Evans et al., 2006).   
Second, on 3 out of 4 clinical units, interviewees felt that some of the informal (i.e., 
physicians) and formal leaders (i.e., managers) ignore the expertise of bedside nurses during 
crisis situations, thereby putting patients at risk. This is consistent with previous research in 
which nurses perceived that their opinions/concerns are not always taken into account by 
physicians during patient care decision making. For example, a cross-sectional survey study, 
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with a sample of 114 nurses and 33 physicians, found that collaborative patient care decision 
making was the least frequently used physician behaviour at an acute care hospital (Nair, 
Fitzpatrick, McNulty, Click, & Glembocki, 2012). Similarly, Niekerk and Martin (2002) conducted 
a survey study to elicit views of 1,015 registered nurses on ethical and professional conflicts 
experienced by them during the provision of pain treatments. The results suggested that 
physicians often inadequately consult nurses while designing pain treatment plans for patients. 
In addition, nurses who felt physicians adequately rely on their pain management advice were 
significantly less likely to experience conflict with physicians compared to those who felt 
physicians ignore their advice. This is important because research in healthcare settings has 
also shown that collegial or collaborative nurse-physician relationships – characterized by 
physicians valuing the unique and overlapping expertise of nurses – are significantly associated 
with positive patient (e.g., lower mortality rates, decreased length of stay) and staff (e.g., 
decreased turnover intention) outcomes (e.g., Baggs et al., 1999; Bogaert, Meulemans, Clarke, 
Vermeyen, & Heyning, 2009; Knaus, Draper, Wagner, & Zimmerman, 1986; Schmalenberg & 
Kramer, 2009). Similarly, empirical research suggests that high quality or positive nurse-
manager relationships are significantly associated with positive nurse (e.g., lower turnover 
intention) and patient (e.g., lower incidence of falls, nosocomial infections, and medication 
errors) outcomes (Galletta, Portoghese, Battistelli, & Leiter, 2012; Germain and Cummings, 
2010; Laschinger and Leiter, 2006).    
Third, consensus emerged in regards to the importance of providing hospital based 
continuous safety training or education to the frontline clinical staff in order to improve their 
capabilities to manage and bounce back from unexpected events. Indeed, empirical research 
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suggests that on-site (e.g., hospital, nursing home) staff training or education can significantly 
improve clinicians’ performance or competence. For example, in the clinical realm a prospective 
randomized cohort study found that low dose (i.e., 5-minute training session) high frequency 
(i.e., 4 training sessions in 6 months) in-hospital cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) training 
significantly improves the CPR performance of pediatric nurses and physicians (Sutton et al., 
2011). The study participants were 2.9 times more likely to perform excellent CPR on a pediatric 
manikin after they have successfully completed 3 training sessions while CPR performance of 
no-training cohort did not improve. An observational cohort study was conducted at a large 
tertiary care hospital in Chicago to determine the impact of simulation-based education on the 
incidence of catheter related bloodstream infections (Barsuk, Cohen, Feinglass, McGaghie, & 
Wayne, 2009). During the study, ninety-two residents at a medical intensive care unit 
completed simulation-based training on how to properly insert a central venous line. It was 
found that ICU patients had a significantly lower incidence of central line infections per 1000 
catheter-days after the implementation of the educational intervention. Similarly, a number of 
other empirical studies have suggested that staff competence and/or quality of patient care 
improves when frontline clinical staff are provided on-site education/training on a wide variety 
of topics including communication (Rollnick, Kinnersley, & Butler, 2002), minimal access 
laparoscopic surgery (Seymour et al., 2002), cancer risk assessment (Blazer et al., 2005), and 
emergency airway management (Mayo et al., 2004).                 
Teamwork Climate 
Hypothesis 3 was supported by the survey results as teamwork climate was shown to be 
significantly associated with the three self-reported safety outcomes (i.e., overall perceptions of 
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patient safety, overall patient safety grade, and turnover intention). These results are 
consistent with past empirical research that has shown staff perceptions of teamwork climate 
significantly impact patient (e.g., adverse events) and staff (e.g., burnout) safety outcomes (e.g., 
Bowers, Nijman, Simpson, & Jones, 2011; Buist et al., 2002; Mardon et al., 2010; Mazzocco et 
al., 2009).  
The survey results found that the perceived quality of teamwork climate was especially 
important for self-reported turnover intention – every 1 point increase in teamwork climate 
resulted in a 1 point decrease in turnover intention. Moreover, nurse survey respondents 
reported higher turnover intentions compared to allied health professionals. Interestingly, past 
empirical research has suggested that nurses are more likely to report high turnover intention 
when they perceived low quality of teamwork climate (Hayes et al., 2012) while turnover 
intention in turn is significantly associated with actual leaving behaviours (Bluedorn, 1982; 
Schwepker, 2001). Consequently, when taken together, it can be argued that healthcare 
organizations may be able reduce nurses’ turnover by focusing their efforts on improving the 
quality of teamwork climate.     
The qualitative findings corroborated the survey results as interviewees perceived 
positive teamwork climate within a unit as critical for patient and staff safety outcomes. In 
addition, the qualitative findings revealed that the clinical staff distinguished the quality of 
teamwork climate across professional and unit boundaries. In general, the interviewees held 
positive perceptions of intra-professional and negative perceptions of inter-professional 
teamwork climate on a clinical unit, this being consistent with past empirical research. For 
example, Creswick, Westbrook, & Braithwaite (2009) carried out a cross-sectional survey study 
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to examine problem-solving, advice-seeking, and socializing networks of staff at an Australian 
emergency department. The study found the majority of work-related collaboration on the unit 
occurred within professional boundaries, i.e., ED clinicians including physicians, nurses and 
allied health staff primarily sought help from and provided assistance to peers in their own 
profession. Similarly, a qualitative study was conducted to examine the impact of professional 
boundaries on quality of teamwork climate at a forensic mental health unit located in London, 
United Kingdom (Shaw, Heyman, Reynolds, Davies, & Godin, 2007). Data were collected 
through (a) direct observations of inter-professional teamwork behaviors and (b) semi-
structured interviews with psychiatrics, nurses, allied health staff (i.e., psychologists, 
occupational therapists, and social workers), and patients. It was found that high quality inter-
professional collaboration rarely emerged on the unit primarily as a consequence of 
power/status inequalities among the professionals – psychiatrists residing at the top and nurses 
at the bottom of the power/status hierarchy. The psychiatrists interacted with other clinicians 
in a manner that solidified bio-medical dominance and marginalized other patient care 
perspectives leading to only ‘tokenistic’ collaboration between psychiatrists and other clinical 
staff. However, on rare occasions, high quality collaboration emerged between nurses and 
allied health professionals when they equally shared the responsibility for patient care 
decisions.         
Interestingly, the qualitative findings of the current study revealed that the nurses were 
especially concerned about the quality of nurse-police teamwork climate on the adult in-patient 
mental health unit. The working relationship between nursing staff and police officers has 
rarely been empirically studied in the healthcare literature. Furthermore, it has primarily been 
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examined from the nurses’ perspective on preventing workplace violence. The empirical 
research on workplace violence suggests that nurses feel safe in the presence of police officers 
but at the same time they perceive that police officers are inadequately trained/educated on 
healthcare issues and institutional policies often fail to clearly outline the responsibilities of 
police officers while they are stationed on a clinical unit (e.g., Catlette, 2005; May & Grubbs, 
2002) – these same factors were also implicated by the interviewees in the current study as 
potential causes of poor nurse-police teamwork climate at the adult in-patient mental health 
unit.    
Moreover, the qualitative findings indicated that higher tenure and higher staffing levels 
are beneficial for teamwork climate and safety outcomes on a clinical unit. Indeed, empirical 
research suggests that a higher nurse-patient ratio or nurse staffing level is significantly 
associated with lower medication errors and patient’s length of stay (Paquet, Courcy, Lavoie-
Tremblay, Gagnon, & Maillet, 2013), lower odds of hospital related adverse events including in-
patient mortality, nosocomial bloodstream infection, hospital acquired pneumonia (Kane, 
Shamliyan, Mueller, Duval, & Wilt, 2007), lower odds of nursing burnout and job dissatisfaction 
(Aiken, Clarke, Sloane, Sochalski, & Silber, 2002), and better nursing teamwork climate (Kalisch 
& Lee, 2011). Similarly, higher nurse tenure or years of experience on a clinical unit is 
significantly associated with lower incidence of patient infections – i.e., pneumonia, pressure 
ulcers, and urinary tract infections (Uchida-Nakakoji, Stone, Schmitt, & Phibbs, 2015), 
decreased probability of nurses’ needlestick injuries (Clarke, Rockett, Sloane, & Aiken, 2002), 
lower patient’s residual length of stay – i.e., actual length of stay minus expected length of stay 
(Bartel, Beaulieu, Phibbs, & Stone, 2014) and better nurse-physician collaboration (Niekerk & 
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Martin, 2002). Interestingly, the survey results showing that clinical staff in the ICU had 
significantly higher tenure and held more positive perceptions of safety outcomes compared to 
the other three participating units are consistent with the qualitative findings on tenure. 
Furthermore, informal conversations with nurse managers and formal interviews with study 
participants revealed that the ICU nurse-patient ratio was much higher compared to the other 
three clinical units – e.g., under normal working conditions, each ICU nurse took care of a single 
patient while each ED nurse was responsible for the care of at least 4 patients. This qualitative 
finding on nurse-patient ratio provides a potential explanation for the significant association of 
ICU and two of the three self-reported safety outcomes.  
Finally, the qualitative findings also revealed that the nursing staff held overwhelmingly 
negative perceptions of the quality of teamwork climate across unit boundaries when it came 
to intra-hospital patient transfers. Much of the empirical research on patient handoffs or 
patient transfers has focused on inter-shift handoffs within the same department and inter-
hospital patient transfers (Ong & Coiera, 2011). However, scarce empirical research on intra-
hospital patient transfer suggests that poor collaboration/teamwork among clinicians involved 
in the transfer process can often lead to medical errors and associated patient harm. For 
example, Horwitz et al., (2009) surveyed all medical staff – e.g., physicians, nurses, and 
physician assistants – responsible for patient transfers from the emergency department to an 
in-patient medicine unit at a large US teaching hospital. Twenty-nine percent of the survey 
respondents reported that poor quality of patient transfers from ED to a medicine unit resulted 
in medical errors (e.g., diagnostic, treatment) causing a patient to experience a near miss or an 
adverse event. Similarly, a retrospective review of 7525 incident reports submitted by 93 ICUs 
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to an Australian incident monitoring system between 1993 and 1999 identified 176 intra-
hospital patient transfer incidents (Beckmann, Gillies, Berenholtz, Wu, & Pronovost, 2004). Of 
these 176 reported incidents, 55 resulted in serious patient harm (e.g., prolonged hospital stay, 
physical injury, or death). A six-month prospective observational study at an Australian teaching 
hospital examined the quality of patient transfers from in-patient wards to radiology (Ong & 
Coiera, 2010). No incidents that caused patient harm were observed, however, patients 
experienced treatment delays and an average of 4 errors per transfer. Some of the key factors 
implicated for the poor quality of intra-hospital patient transfers in the empirical literature 
include omitted or inaccurate patient information, overcrowding, professional conflicts, and 
contrasting patient care expectations or approaches (e.g., Apker, Mallak, & Gibson, 2007; 
Beckmann et al., 2004; Horwitz et al., 2009; Ong & Coiera, 2010) – these factors were also 
identified by the interviewees in the current study as potential sources of poor teamwork 
climate across unit boundaries.         
Linking Back to Study’s Conceptual Framework  
According to the enabling, enacting, and elaborating safety culture framework, external 
(e.g., accreditation) and internal (e.g., leader behaviours) forces shape safety climate 
perceptions of frontline staff by prioritizing or subordinating safety over other organizational 
goals. This in turn motivates or discourages, the frontline staff to participate in safety enhancing 
behaviours – e.g., teamwork and mindful organizing – capable of improving safety outcomes on 
the frontlines. The results of the current mixed methods cross-sectional study lend support to 
this framework as both safety climate and teamwork climate were shown to significantly 
impact safety outcomes. In addition, the results suggest a potential avenue of refinement to 
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the framework in terms of accounting for both safety climate and teamwork climate’s boundary 
conditions. More specifically, the current study’s results found that the frontline clinical staff 
distinguished between safety priorities of supervisory and senior leaders leading to the 
emergence of two concurrent safety climate perceptions. Similarly, the frontline clinical staff 
highlighted that the quality of teamwork climate were effected by profession and clinical unit 
boundaries.  
Caution should be exercised while describing mindful organizing as an enacting process 
based on the results of the current study – the survey found a non-significant relationship 
between SOS and safety outcomes while the interviews did not directly solicit information on 
mindful organizing. However, interviewees indirectly acknowledged the importance of certain 
processes of mindful organizing (i.e., preoccupation with failure, commitment to resilience, and 
deference to expertise) to safety outcomes, warranting further research to explore this 
association. Finally, interviewees suggested that adequate staffing levels and on-site 
training/education enhances the quality of teamwork climate and mindful organizing 
respectively – lending support to the conceptual model’s assertion that human resource 
practices are an enabling force that motivates/discourages frontline staff to enact safety 
enhancing practices (see figure 1.1).       
Climate Profile 
The RWG values based on a slightly skewed null distribution revealed that there was lack 
of agreement among survey respondents on senior leadership support for safety at all four 
participating clinical units (RWG range = 0.08 – 0.49). Similarly, there was lack of agreement on 
supervisory leadership support for safety at three out of four clinical units (RWG range = 0.11 – 
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0.46), ICU being the exception (RWG = 0.68). In contrast, the perceptions of clinical staff on 
teamwork climate were strongly aligned at three out of four clinical units (RWG range = 0.74 – 
0.88), the adult in-patient mental health unit being the exception where there was considerable 
variability or lack of agreement on teamwork climate (RWG = 0.19). The RWG results for 
teamwork climate were corroborated to a certain extent by the qualitative findings as an 
outlier emerged on the adult in-patient mental health unit that held overwhelmingly different 
teamwork climate compared to her peers.   
Overall, it can be argued that weak climates persisted at the adult in-patient mental 
health unit. Moreover, the histograms representing climates at the mental health unit were 
consistently bimodal in nature, indicating the presence of two distinct subgroups that perceived 
the quality of safety on the unit quite differently (see Appendix 8). There were instances of 
bimodal climate shapes emerging on other clinical units but for the most part the histograms 
representing climate shapes at other units were normally distributed.  
These findings lend support to previous research suggesting that relegation of climate 
strength as a mere statistical hurdle to justify aggregation of individual level climate data to 
team/unit level has resulted in an incomplete understanding of the safety climate construct 
(Ginsburg & Oore, 2015; Singer & Vogus 2013a). The use of holistic climate profiles (i.e., levels, 
strengths, & shapes of climates) would also help healthcare organizations implement safety 
improvement initiatives tailored to the needs of a particular clinical unit. For example, it may be 
necessary to hold a series of focus groups on a clinical unit that has moderate level of safety 
climate, weak safety climate strength, and a bimodal safety climate shape to fully understand 
the safety perceptions of distinct subgroups before implementing a safety improvement 
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intervention. On the other hand, an intervention that clarifies safety procedures, norms, and 
behaviours may benefit a clinical unit with a moderate level of safety climate, weak safety 
climate strength, and rectangular climate shape.  
Limitations and Future Research  
The current mixed methods study was cross-sectional and therefore causal associations 
between predictor and outcome variables cannot be established (Mathieu & Taylor, 2006). It is 
difficult to conduct experimental studies in healthcare settings but healthcare research would 
benefit from more longitudinal quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods studies (Galletta, 
Portoghese, Battistelli, & Leiter, 2012; Wong, Cummings, & Ducharme, 2013). Also, the current 
study utilized self-reported measures that are subject to social desirability biases (Foley, 
Manuel, & Vitolins, 2005; Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). However, assuring survey participants 
anonymity and interviewees full confidentiality, as was done in the current study, can minimize 
socially desirable responding (Randall & Fernandes, 1991).  
  In the healthcare arena, much of the empirical research on safety and quality has 
primarily focused on understanding the perceptions of nurses and to a lesser extent those of 
physicians while largely ignoring the perspectives of other healthcare professionals. In order to 
address this literature gap, the current study solicited safety perceptions of allied health 
professionals and unit clerics, in addition to frontline nurses. However, qualitative data analyses 
revealed that other clinical (e.g., physicians, nurse-managers) and non-clinical (e.g., police) 
professionals were seen by study’s participants as indispensable partners for enhancing staff 
and patient safety outcomes, warranting the need for future research to simultaneously 
examine the safety perceptions of a much wider variety of healthcare professionals.      
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In the current study, quantitative data analyses were completed before the start of 
qualitative data analyses and the researcher responsible for both sets of analyses could not be 
blinded to the clinical units during qualitative analyses thereby creating the possibility of 
researcher bias in the interpretation of the qualitative data. Furthermore, it became apparent 
during qualitative data collection and analyses that short semi-structured interviews were not 
ideal for soliciting staff perceptions of mindful organizing – perhaps because hospital staff are 
not aware of processes of mindful organizing to the same extent as they are of more commonly 
discussed safety areas such as communication, teamwork, and leadership. Consequently, it is 
recommended that future studies utilize observations or focus groups to capture greater social 
context and thereby gain a better understanding of mindful organizing at the frontlines.  
An important finding of the qualitative data analyses was that clinical staff differentiated 
between inter and intra professional teamwork climate. However, interviewees in the current 
study predominantly consisted of nurses and it is recommended that future qualitative/mixed 
methods studies utilize sampling techniques that are able to capture the perceptions of a larger 
number of non-nursing hospital staff in order to validate the current study’s findings on inter 
and intra professional teamwork climate.     
The current study utilized convenience and snowball sampling procedures to collect 
survey data from four clinical units at a single large community hospital, limiting the ability to 
generalize the study’s findings to other types of clinical units (e.g., surgery or pediatrics) and 
hospitals (e.g., small community or teaching). Finally, the sample size for semi-structured 
interviews was small, especially for non-nursing professionals – e.g., only 1 clerical staff was 
interviewed – and therefore caution should be exercised while interpreting the qualitative 
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findings. Consequently, it is recommended that future mixed methods research test the validity 
of the current study’s inferences by utilizing a larger multi-site sample.  
Implications for Practice 
 The current study’s results suggest that the frontline clinicians prefer relationship-
oriented leaders over task-oriented leaders at both supervisory and senior leadership roles. The 
relational practices – e.g., providing vision, support, and constructive feedback – of formal 
healthcare leaders are associated with better staff and patient outcomes (e.g., Laschinger and 
Leiter, 2006; Wong, Cummings, & Ducharme, 2013). Therefore, it is important for healthcare 
institutions to recruit and retain individuals possessing relational competencies into leadership 
roles at all levels of an organization. Moreover, healthcare leaders must prioritize safety over 
efficiency and be cognizant of the limitations of certain performance indicators – e.g., average 
length of stay, average cost per discharge – as such indices tend to put emphasis on efficiency.   
 The current health care delivery systems are under increasing pressure to 
simultaneously contain costs and preserve quality of care, necessitating higher levels of inter 
and intra professional collaboration or teamwork. At the same time, empirical research 
suggests that clinicians belonging to different professions – e.g., physicians, nurses – hold 
different perspectives on and expectations from collaborative or teamwork behaviours at the 
frontlines (Copnell et al., 2004). Therefore, healthcare organizations must provide on-site inter-
professional collaborative workshops on topics that can strengthen working relationships such 
as conflict management, inter-professional respect, negotiation skills, and stress management 
(Nair, Fitzpatrick, McNulty, Click, & Glembocki, 2012).     
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Furthermore, the frontline clinicians would benefit from on-site clinical training and 
presence of adequate staffing resources so that they are able to provide high quality care to 
their patients (e.g., Kane, Shamliyan, Mueller, Duval, & Wilt, 2007; Sutton et al., 2011). 
Moreover, it can be argued that the presence of relational leaders, collaborative work 
environments, adequate staffing levels, and on-site professional development/educational 
opportunities will help retain longer-tenured frontline clinical staff, potentially improving safety 
outcomes at a clinical unit (e.g., Clarke, Rockett, Sloane, & Aiken, 2002; Uchida-Nakakoji, Stone, 
Schmitt, & Phibbs, 2015).  
In general, the study participants from the adult in-patient mental health unit held 
poorer perceptions of domain specific climates and safety outcomes compared to staff on the 
other participating clinical units. Indeed, the past empirical research has shown that staff 
perceptions of climate differ between clinical units (Singer et al., 2009a) while clinical areas 
such as mental health and long-term care have been noted for resource scarcity, quality issues, 
and inadequate staff training (Armstrong et al., 2009). The results of the current study, along 
with previous empirical research, suggest that healthcare managers/leaders must devote more 
attention and perhaps resources to improving patient and staff safety on mental health units. 
Finally, a healthcare organization trying to improve patient and staff safety can and 
should generate a climate profile (i.e., climate’s level, strength, and pattern) to get a more 
nuanced understanding of any given domain specific climate (e.g., safety climate, 
communication climate, work-ownership climate). The use of information gleaned from holistic 
climate profiles should allow the design of tailored safety improvement strategies that are 
more likely to be successful in changing practice at the frontlines (Ginsburg & Oore, 2015).    
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Conclusion 
 The “To Err is Human” (Institute of Medicine, 2000) and “Crossing the Quality Chasm” 
(Institute of Medicine, 2001) reports highlighted acute quality and safety deficiencies in the 
healthcare delivery systems and in doing so energized the scientific community and healthcare 
professionals to design, evaluate, and implement safety improvement strategies at the 
frontlines. Indeed, implementation of standardized clinical interventions such as hand hygiene 
guidelines (Goldmann et al., 2009), and surgical checklists (World Health Organization, 2008) 
have reduced occurrence of medical errors and associated patient harm. Moreover, there is 
increasing empirical evidence of the indispensable impact of contextual factors (e.g., 
communication, teamwork, safety climate) on quality of care and safety outcomes (e.g., Bosk, 
Dixon-Woods, Goeschel, & Pronovost, 2009; Bowers, Nijman, Simpson, & Jones, 2011; Niekerk 
and Martin, 2002), however, certain literature gaps still remain including an over-reliance on 
quantitative research (Woodward et al., 2010), imprecise conceptualization of constructs – e.g., 
safety climate (Zohar, 2008), lack of empirical research rooted in theory (Singer & Vogus, 
2013a), and limited empirical evidence of the beneficial impact of certain contextual factors 
(e.g., mindful organizing) on safety outcomes etc. The results of the current mixed methods 
study suggest that safety climate, teamwork climate, and mindful organizing demonstrably 
impact frontline clinical staff perceptions of safety outcomes, thereby addressing some 
apparent gaps in the organizational safety literature. The current study, together with future 
research will broaden our understanding of how context-specific factors influence safety 
outcomes, and ideally help improve delivery of patient care at the frontlines.   
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Appendix 1: Interview Guide 
Face-sheet 
 
Date of Interview:   
 
 
 
Time of Interview: 
 
 
 
Location of Interview: 
 
 
 
Written Consent Obtained: 
 
 
 
Extra notes: 
 
 
 
 
132 
 
Interview Guide 
1)  Can you tell me about what you do here?  For how long have you worked at 
this unit? 
 
 
 
2)  Can you think about the last patient safety incident you were involved in? Can 
you briefly describe what happened? 
• Potential probes: 
• Is this a typical type of safety issue at your unit? 
 
 
 
 
3)  So, what was the outcome of this incident and in your view what factors 
contributed to this outcome?  
• Potential probes: 
• a) What about:  
• Leaders? 
• Teamwork & communication? 
• Feeling safe while reporting errors? 
• Utilization of staff expertise?  
 
 
 
4)  Is there anything else we have not discussed yet that you believe is important 
for delivering safe care at your work place?  
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Post Interview Comment Sheet 
Description of the setting and the participant: 
 
 
 
Emotional tone of the interview: 
 
 
 
Any particular difficulties encountered during the interview: 
 
 
 
My feelings during and about the experience: 
 
 
 
Personal insights and reflections: 
 
 
 
Extra notes: 
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Appendix 2: Survey Instrument 
Patient Safety Survey 
1. On which patient care unit you spend the most time? Unit name: __________________________ 
2. For how long have you been working on this unit?  
          6-24 months                                     
          2-5 years                                     
          > 5 years   
3. Safety Climate 
We are looking for your perceptions and opinions of these safety issues. While thinking about your unit, 
indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statement.  
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
N/A 
a) Senior management has a clear picture of the 
risk associated with patient care 
      
b) Patient safety decisions are made at the proper 
level by the most qualified people 
      
c) Senior management provides a climate that 
promotes patient safety 
      
d) Senior management considers patient safety 
when program changes are discussed 
      
e) My supervisor/manager says a good word when 
he/she sees a job done according to established 
patient safety procedures 
      
f) My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff 
suggestions for improving patient safety 
      
4. Safety Behaviours 
Please think about the unit where you work most when responding to the following statements.  
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
N/A 
a) It is easy for personnel in this unit to ask 
questions when there is something that they do 
not understand.  
      
b) I have the support I need from other personnel 
to care for patients.  
      
c) Team input is well received in this unit.        
d) In this unit, it is difficult to Speak Up if I perceive 
a problem with patient care.  
      
e) Disagreements in this unit are resolved 
appropriately (i.e., not who is right, but what is 
best for the patient).  
      
f) The physicians and nurses and other team 
members here work together as a well-
coordinated team.  
      
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Not at all 
To a very 
limited 
extent 
To a 
limited 
extent 
To a 
moderate 
extent 
To a 
conside
rable 
extent 
To a great 
extent 
To a very 
great 
extent 
g) We have a good “map” of each other’s 
talents and skills 
       
h) We talk about mistakes and ways to 
learn from them 
       
i) We discuss our unique skills with each 
other so we know who on the unit has 
relevant specialized skills and 
knowledge 
       
j) We discuss alternatives as to how to go 
about our normal work activities 
       
k) When giving report to an oncoming 
nurse/staff, we usually discuss what to 
look out for 
       
l) When attempting to resolve a problem, 
we take advantage of the unique skills 
of our colleagues 
       
m) We spend time identifying activities we 
do not want to go wrong 
       
n) When errors happen, we discuss how 
we could have prevented them 
       
o) When a patient crisis occurs, we rapidly 
pool our collective expertise to attempt 
to resolve it 
       
5. Safety Outcomes 
Please think about the unit where you work most when responding to the following statements.  
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
a) Patient safety is never sacrificed to get more 
work done 
     
b) Our procedures and systems are good at 
preventing errors from happening 
     
c) It is just by chance that more serious mistakes 
don't happen around here 
     
d) We have patient safety problems in this unit      
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewh
at 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Somewh
at 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
e) There is a good chance that I will leave 
this job in the next year or so 
       
f) I frequently think of quitting this job        
g)  I will probably look for a new job in the 
next year 
       
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– Thank you for completing this questionnaire – 
h) Please give your work area/unit in this hospital an overall grade on patient safety.   
     
A 
Excellent 
B 
Very Good 
C 
Acceptable 
D 
Poor 
E 
Failing 
5. Demographic Information: 
 
      <30                                    Female                                 Registered Practical Nurse (RPN)                                                                                                  
      31-40                                 Male                                    Registered Nurse (RN) 
      41-50                                                                                  Nurse Practitioner (NP) 
      51-60                                                                                  Allied Health Professional (AHP) 
      > 60                                                                                      Clerical Staff 
                                                                                                       Other: ___________     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c) Profession: b) Gender: a) Age: 
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Appendix 3: Bivariate Scatter Plots 
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Appendix 4: Residual Scatter Plots & P-P Plots 
First Hierarchical Regression Analysis – Predictors: ICU, ED, Mental Health, Tenure 2-5 years, Tenure > 
5 years, Age < 30 years, Age 31-40 years, Age 41-50 years, Female, RPN, RN, AHP, Senior leadership 
support for safety, supervisory leadership support for safety, teamwork, SOS. Outcome: Overall 
Perceptions of PS 
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Second Hierarchical Regression Analysis – Predictors: ICU, ED, Mental Health, Tenure 2-5 years, Tenure 
> 5 years, Age < 30 years, Age 31-40 years, Age 41-50 years, Female, RPN, RN, AHP, Senior leadership 
support for safety, supervisory leadership support for safety, teamwork, SOS. Outcome: Overall PS 
Grade 
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Third Hierarchical Regression Analysis – Predictors: ICU, ED, Mental Health, Tenure 2-5 years, Tenure > 
5 years, Age < 30 years, Age 31-40 years, Age 41-50 years, Female, RPN, RN, AHP, Senior leadership 
support for safety, supervisory leadership support for safety, teamwork, SOS. Outcome: Turnover 
Intention 
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Appendix 5: Skewness Calculations 
 
Table: Skewness Values 
 
 
 
Overall perceptions of patient safety = .053 < 2 x .180 = .360 
Overall patient safety grade = .303 < 2 x .180 = .360  
Hence, both of these dependent variables were normally distributed.  
 
Turnover intention = .396 > 2 x .180 = .360 
Hence, turnover intention was found to be slightly skewed. 
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Appendix 6: Chi-square & K-W tests for Demographic Variables 
Table: Chi-square tests for gender by clinical unit 
 
 
Table: Chi-square tests for profession by clinical unit    
 
 
Table: Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA for tenure 
 
 
Table: Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA for age 
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Appendix 7: Hierarchical Regression Analyses without Missing Data Imputations  
 
Table: Results of First Hierarchical Regression Analysis (DV = Overall Perceptions of PS) 
 Model 1, β Model 2, β Model 3, β 
Block 1 – Socio-Demographic Dummy Variables 
ICU .815*** .751*** .585** 
ED .049 .016 -.040 
Mental Health -.596** -.364 -.373* 
Tenure (2-5 Years) -.080 .022 .116 
Tenure (> 5 Years) -.444* -.282 -.186 
Age (< 30 Years) -.186 -.056 -.114 
Age (31-40 Years) -.174 -.089 -.111 
Age (41-50 Years) -.097 -.076 -.079 
Female -.305 -.132 -.102 
RPN .139 .338 .265 
RN -.184 .107 .077 
AHP -.069 .009 .125 
Block 2 – Leadership Support for Safety 
Senior Leadership  .411*** .343*** 
Supervisory Leadership  .013 -.096 
Block 3 – Frontline Clinical Staff Behaviours 
Teamwork   .409*** 
SOS   .036 
Total R2 (adjusted) .203*** .380*** .444*** 
Change in R2 .262*** .172*** .065*** 
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. (N = 164). Reference groups: General Medicine, Tenure (6-24 
months), Age (> 51 years), Male, and Clerical Staff.  
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Table: Results of Second Hierarchical Regression Analysis (DV = Overall PS Grade) 
 Model 1, β Model 2, β Model 3, β 
Block 1 – Socio-Demographic Dummy Variables 
ICU .895*** .811*** .665*** 
ED .327 .279 .223 
Mental Health -.493* -.203 -.202 
Tenure (2-5 Years) -.261 -.193 -.065 
Tenure (> 5 Years) -.333 -.148 -.055 
Age (< 30 Years) .028 .213 .158 
Age (31-40 Years) .012 .128 .110 
Age (41-50 Years) .346 .407* .389* 
Female -.297 -.044 -.008 
RPN .182 .422 .350 
RN -.053 .292 .271 
AHP -.159 -.122 .005 
Block 2 – Leadership Support for Safety 
Senior Leadership  .488*** .428*** 
Supervisory Leadership  .033 -.066 
Block 3 – Frontline Clinical Staff Behaviours 
Teamwork   .320** 
SOS   .085 
Total R2 (adjusted) .195*** .444*** .493*** 
Change in R2 .255*** .237*** .052*** 
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. (N = 161). Reference groups: General Medicine, Tenure (6-24 
months), Age (> 51 years), Male, and Clerical Staff.  
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Table: Results of Third Hierarchical Regression Analysis (DV = Turnover Intention) 
 Model 1, β Model 2, β Model 3, β 
Block 1 – Socio-Demographic Dummy Variables 
ICU -.812 -.766 -.345 
ED -.599 -.571 -.438 
Mental Health .518 .382 .332 
Tenure (2-5 Years) -.030 -.063 -.446 
Tenure (> 5 Years) .530 .428 .154 
Age (< 30 Years) -.037 -.090 .074 
Age (31-40 Years) .196 .163 .220 
Age (41-50 Years) .299 .299 .375 
Female .063 -.042 -.129 
RPN -.676 -.815 -.618 
RN -.230 -.409 -.327 
AHP -1.511* -1.559* -1.929** 
Block 2 – Leadership Support for Safety 
Senior Leadership  -.246 -.059 
Supervisory Leadership  .001 .283 
Block 3 – Frontline Clinical Staff Behaviours 
Teamwork   -.972*** 
SOS   -.237 
Total R2 (adjusted) .038 .040 .155*** 
Change in R2 .109 .014 .116*** 
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. (N = 162). Reference groups: General Medicine, Tenure (6-24 
months), Age (> 51 years), Male, and Clerical Staff.  
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Appendix 8: Climate Profile Histograms 
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